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EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AFTER
GILMER: HAVE LABOR COURTS COME
TO THE UNITED STATES?
Robert N. Covington*

I.

ITN-TRODUCInON

The Sunday, July 28, 1996, edition of the New York Times carried
a story bannered: "Workers Who Sign Away A Day in Court."1
The text of the story reflects the tone of the headline. More and
more employees, the story indicated, are being required by corporate employers to surrender their opportunity to seek damages in
court for such wrongs as sexual harassment and age discrimination.2
Instead, the article said, the employees are required by the terms of
their employment contracts to submit those claims to arbitration,
often under rules that limit the damages that can be awarded, and
limit the procedural rights of workers to examine witnesses and
seek documents from employer files?
For a trend in the mundane business of drafting employment contracts to reach the newspapers, it must be a significant development
indeed. The movement toward widespread use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") in the workplace for non-unionized
employees has picked up speed dramatically in recent years.4 As
the Times story indicates, there is no reliable statistical source to
tell us exactly how many employers require employees to sign arbi*
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1. Roy Furchgott, Workers Who Sign Away a Day in Court, N.Y. TIMms, July 28, 1996,
at F9.

2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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tration agreements as a condition of getting or keeping a job, but
there is strong evidence of the growing importance of these
clauses. 5 That story cites a poll by a well- known headhunting firm
that found that roughly one-third of American companies with
twenty or more employees have plans to increase their use of formal employment contracts including agreements to arbitrate.6 The
use of these clauses has been the subject of widespread comment by
government officials, arbitration agencies, and employment
lawyers.7
Until the beginning of this decade, many observers thought that
employers could not insist that employees agree to arbitrate claims
under the major protective labor statutes, particularly those shielding employees from invidious discrimination.8 The reason was the
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Corp.9 The plaintiff in Gardner-Denverhad pursued a discrimination claim through the grievance system provided by his union's collective bargaining agreement with the defendant employer. 10 The
arbitrator denied the claim, and the plaintiff then sued under Title
VII. 11 The employer sought to have the case dismissed on the
grounds of the outcome of the arbitration. 2 The Supreme Court
held that Mr. Alexander was entitled to have his claim heard by the
federal courts. 3 Justice Powell's opinion for a unanimous Court
found that "[tihere is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a
prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual's right to sue
or divests federal courts of jurisdiction."' 4 The Court specifically
rejected arguments that a claimant should be required to elect
between pursuit of arbitration under a collective agreement on the
one hand, and pursuit of a remedy in court on the other;15 that
5. See id.
6. See id
7. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Getting Out of a J.A.M.S., A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 41;
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1996, at 58 [hereinafter
MandatoryArbitration].

8. See Mandatory Arbitration,supra note 7, at 58.
9. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

10.
11.
(1994).
12.
13.
14.
15.

See id. at 39.
See id. at 42; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-200e-17
See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 43.
See id. at 59-60.
Id. at 47.
See id. at 47-49.
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plaintiff had waived his rights under Title VII by pursuing arbitration, or that his union had-or could-make such a waiver on his
behalf;' 6 or that the courts should defer to the factual findings of
the arbitrator about the reasons plaintiff was discharged. 7 In the
course of the opinion, Justice Powell emphasized that an individual
Title VII plaintiff does more than vindicate his or her own rights.
That plaintiff also "vindicates the important congressional policy
against discriminatory employment practices.""8 He also commented at some length on the limitations the typical arbitrator
experiences in making findings of fact:
[T]he factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent
to judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings
is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony
under
9
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.'
The language of the Gardner-Denveropinion as well as the outcome of the case led many lower courts and commentators to conclude that a person who claims his or her statutory rights have been
violated is entitled to have that claim evaluated by a court. This did
not mean that discrimination grievances were not heard by arbitrators in the years following Gardner-Denver.Many workers chose to
use the faster, cheaper arbitration forum as a place to air complaints rather than pursue a judicial remedy. A worker who
believed that both her employer and also her union were engaged
in gender discrimination would not, however, be likely to want to
entrust that claim entirely to the union's handling of the grievance
and arbitration system at her workplace. The common belief was
that she could not be forced to, and that even if the claim was pursued through arbitration, an adverse arbitrator's decision would not
be final.
Then came the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.20 The plaintiff in Gilmer was required by
his employer, the defendant, to register as a stockbroker with the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 51.
See Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 55-59.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 57-58.
500 U.S. 20 (1990).
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New York Stock Exchange ("the Exchange" or "NYSE"). 1 One
provision of the application form he had to execute in order to register stated that he agreed to abide by the rules of the Exchange.2
One of those rules called for the arbitration of all disputes between
him and his firm.2 Later, he was discharged, and filed suit against
his former employer, claiming that his firing violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 24 The plaintiff was

sixty-two at the time he was fired35 The defendant filed a motion
to compel the plaintiff to submit the claim to arbitration.2 6 The district court denied the motion, citing Gardner-Denver, but the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court
upheld the Circuit Court's decision in an opinion by Justice
White. 7 Justices Stevens and Marshall dissented. 8
Justice White's opinion begins with a brief review of how the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")

9

has been interpreted in recent

years? 0

In particular, he notes that statutory rights under securities
laws were held to be subject to arbitration in a well-known 1985
case.3 1 Thus, the law has come full circle from the hostility toward
arbitration that existed before the FAA was passed, to a position
that "'questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."' 3 2 The plaintiff
argued that compelling arbitration would undermine the framework for resolving charges of discrimination set up by the Congress;
a scheme that envisions conciliation attempts by the Equal Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") followed by litigation instituted
either by the wronged individual or the EEOC itself.33 Justice
White's response is to say that "mere involvement of an administra21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.at 23.
i.
idid.; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1997).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
id. at 24.
id.
id. at 22, 36.

29. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1994).
30. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-26.

31. See id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985)).
32. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
33. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
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tive agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration., 3 4 He points to the use of arbitration to resolve
disputes that required interpretation of the securities laws.35 He
argues, in fact, that since the principal role of the EEOC is to
attempt to conciliate, the Act assumes that many disputes will be
settled privately by the parties, without formal judicial
involvement.3 6
The plaintiff also complained that arbitration procedures would
not be adequate for the prosecution of discrimination claims,3 7 an
argument that harks back to Justice Powell's opinion in GardnerDenver."8 The seven justice majority in Gilmer addresses the argument "only briefly"3 9 before rejecting it. First, given the trend
toward favoring arbitration, the Court would not indulge in a presumption that "the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious
and impartial arbitrators."4 Next, Justice White's opinion reviews
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange and finds they provide
adequate procedural protections against bias, as well as provisions
allowing limited discovery and requiring a written award that at
least summarizes the arbitrator's understanding of the issues
involved.4 ' These summaries are to be made available to the public. 42 If the rules are not in fact adequate to protect against bias,
Justice White notes, there is always the possibility of review by a
court to overturn or deny enforcement of the arbitrator's award.43
He also rejects plaintiff's argument that remedies available in arbitration are likely to be more limited than those available in a judicial forum, pointing to a NYSE rule that allows arbitrators to award
"damages and/or other relief."4 4 Finally, in dicta, Justice White
casts aside the argument that arbitration forums are not able to
34. Id. at 28-29.
35. See id. at 29 (citing Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220

(1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
36. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
37. See id. at 31.
38. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
39. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
40. Id. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 673 (1985)).
41. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
42. See id. at 32.
43. See id. at 30.
44. Id. at 32.
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handle class actions, a type of proceeding that has been common in
discrimination cases. 4 5 The arbitration rules available in the case of

the New York Stock Exchange do envision multiple claims as a possibility, he notes, and even if they did not, possible shortcomings in
class actions should not be a reason to deny arbitration of an individual claim.4 6

The plaintiff also argued that it is improper to enforce a waiver of
an employee's right to a judicial forum that is contained in a contract of adhesion, a contract about which he had no power to bargain.47 That a person seeking employment usually has far less
bargaining power than the potential employer is no reason to deny
enforcement, Justice White reasons, so long as that worker was not
"coerced or defrauded" into making the agreement. 8
The Gilmer majority also rejects the argument that requiring
49 Justice White's
arbitration is inconsistent with Gardner-Denver.
opinion emphasizes two differences between the cases. First, he
notes, it would not be reasonable to have read the collective bargaining agreement in the earlier case to authorize the arbitrator to
resolve statutory issues; that arbitrator was limited to deciding
whether the agreement had been breached.50 Second, there is a difference between bargaining under a collective agreement, in which
the individual is represented by a union, and arbitration under an
individual contract. 51 In the latter case, there need be no concern
about "the tension between collective representation and individual
statutory rights ... ."52 This may imply that a union may sometimes
be ready to surrender an individual's statutory right to achieve
some other bargaining objective. 3
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32. Id.
48. See id. at 33. As discussed below, this goes beyond what was truly necessary to
decide here, since the employer in this case had little, if any, control over the content of the
arbitration rule of the New York Stock Exchange.
49. See id. at 33; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
50. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
51. See id.
52. Id.

53. The lower federal courts continue to apply Alexander v. Gardner-Denverin cases
involving arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Martin v. Dana Corp.,
114 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1997). One can argue, however, that if an arbitrator is clearly
empowered to consider statutory rights, and if the individual grievant is given a significant
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This article first summarizes some of the initial reactions to Gilmer. These reactions range from enthusiastic endorsement to vigorous denunciation. Taken together with the arguments made by
the parties in Gilmer itself, they provide an overview of the competing values the courts must balance in answering the three questions
this article focuses on next: (1) How many employees are excepted
from the coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act by the "contracts
of employment" language in section 1 of that statute? (2) If an
agreement includes a promise to arbitrate future disputes between
an employer and employee, what standards must be met in order to
justify a court's order to take a dispute to arbitration? The Gilmer
opinion provides limited guidance on this, leaving the lower courts
to articulate more concrete requirements. (3) How extensively will
the opinions of Gilmer arbitrators be reviewed by the courts for
errors in procedure, fact-finding, or law?
The article concludes by arguing that what we see emerging after
Gilmer could be the development of a series of labor and employment law courts in the United States. They differ from ordinary
courts in being privately funded and administered, but if (1) a vigorous labor and employment bar sees to it that the firms that provide
arbitrators live up to the pledges they have been making during the
past two or three years, and (2) the federal courts, on their own or
at the instruction of the Congress, develop meaningful standards of
judicial review, then there is good reason to believe that the system
will provide substantial justice to the workers and employers who
pursue their claims in arbitration.
II. REACTIONS TO GILMER: PRAISE,
CONDEMNATION, EXTENSION

A. Response from Practitionersand Academics
Whatever else may be said of the Gilmer decision, it has attracted
a substantial audience. The opinion has been the subject of commentary in well over a hundred law review articles,5 4 and has been

chewed over in countless academic conferences, after-dinner
role in the grievance and arbitration process, the reasoning of Gilmer might call for a
modification of Gardner-Denver.
54. See, e.g., Robert Covington, After-Acquired Evidence: What Should Arbitrators and
Courts Do After Misco, McKennon and Gilmer?, 6 . INDrvIDuAL EMP. RTS. 81 (1997); John
A. Gray, Have the Foxes Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer Legal
Status of PredisputeMandatoryArbitration as a Condition of Employment, 37 ViLL L. REv.
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speeches, and briefings for managers. Some of the issues spawned
by the decision were the subject of a Task Force on Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Employment that included representatives of
the American Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, the National Employment Lawyers Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, the National Academy of Arbitrators,
and the Labor and Employment Law Section of the American Bar
Association." The end product of their work was a "Due Process
Protocol," ultimately endorsed by the American Bar Association,
that may have far-reaching implications. 6
The outcome in Gilmer has been welcomed by the organizations
that provide arbitrators. 7 One would expect that. Gilmer should
mean more business for these firms, and thus promoting its broad
application is in their self interest. Moreover, as promoters of alternative dispute resolution, they are "true believers" in the advantages of private over public forums. Not everything about the
opinion pleases everyone in the arbitration profession, however.
The members of the National Academy of Arbitrators discussed the
implications of the opinion at their annual meeting in May of
1997.58 There was strong sentiment opposing the use of mandatory
arbitration agreement as a condition of employment.5 9 The group
nonetheless decided that it is appropriate for Academy members to
participate in employment law arbitration cases involving statutory
rights.60 This means that those seeking arbitrators for such cases
will have access to an experienced and widely respected group of
decision-makers.

113 (1992); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HoIsamA LAB. L.J. 1, 28 (1996).
55. See A Due Process Protocalfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes

Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, Disp. REsoL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37, 39.
[hereinafter Due Process].

56. See id.
57. See, e.g., William K. Slate II, Defining the Employment ADR Advantage, Disp.
REsOL J. Oct.-Dec. 1995 2, 2 (1997).

58. ArbitratorsOppose MandatoryArbitration,Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA), June 16,1997 at
72.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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Most management lawyers also praise the Gilmer result,61 and
this, too, was predictable. Anything that might enhance employer
control over the decision-making process is likely to be viewed
favorably by management lawyers. Public trials of issues such as
sexual harassment can be embarrassing. There may also be dollars
saved in terms of lower lawyer fees and the like. If the availability
of arbitration prompts the filing of a larger number of claims, or
means that fewer claimants are discouraged by long delays at the
EEOC and in fact go forward with their claims, that attitude may
change. It is far too early, however, to know whether either of
those things will happen.
The plaintiff's employment law bar has generally criticized Gilmer.62 These lawyers have become skilled over the years in the
effective use of discovery to help make out a case, and are adept at
developing proposals for remedies that make use of the full equitable powers of the federal courts. It is hardly surprising that they
would be unenthusiastic about being required to pursue cases in
forums with which they are not as well acquainted and which lack
many of the procedures they have learned to employ so effectively.
They are not so much hostile to arbitration per se as they are to the
requirement that arbitration be the only forum available. At one
point, in fact, the National Employment Lawyers Association stated
that it would boycott agencies supplying arbitrators to resolve disputes under mandatory arbitration clauses that do not provide for
broad remedies-including punitive damages-and procedural
safeguards such as reasonable rights of discovery.63
It seems likely that both the management and the plaintiff's bar
share a perception that employees win more often in court than in
arbitration, and that the judgments tend to be larger. A recent article by David Schwartz reviews the anecdotal as well as the very
limited empirical evidence on point.' As he points out, the attitude of the bar goes far beyond what the empirical evidence would
demonstrate. 65 He nonetheless concludes that the "clues" in the
61. See, e.g., Catherine B. Hagen & Kathleen B. Hayward, The Issues Concerning
Mandatory Arbitration,Disp. REsOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 23.
62. See, e.g., Employment Discrimination, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1613, 1626-27 (1995)
(remarks of Judith Vladeck).

63. See Richard C. Reuben, Getting Out of a J.A.M.S., A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 41.
64. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Printto ProtectBig Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 64-66.

65. See id. at 66.
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empirical evidence indicate a probability that the attorney perception is accurate. 66 It would be surprising, one would think, for this
is not true. The arbitration claims include far more cases in which
no attorney participated.67 This means not only that the claim may
not have been pressed vigorously, but also that there was no attorney advice to abandon claims that were unlikely to succeed. This
"gatekeeper" function of the bar is one that is far from fully understood, but is clearly an important one. Even if one has attorney
participation, however, it is more likely that a marginal claim may
be pursued in an arbitration forum, because of the lower costs, both
out-of-pocket and in scheduling. Schwartz argues that the absence
of attorneys for plaintiffs is a mark against the use of arbitration, a
good lawyerly attitude, of course.68 There is a countervailing argument, obviously, that there may be times when the presence of lawyers schooled in an adversary system may not be all that desirable.69
Academic response to the Gilmer outcome has been mixed.
Much of it is relatively neutral, such as Professor Gorman's remarks
in the Benjamin Aaron Lecture he gave at U.C.L.A. in 1994.70
Some is notably hostile, arguing that the Gilmer majority seriously
underestimated the importance of a public forum and judicial procedures to the uncovering and undoing of discrimination. 7 ' Professors Joseph Grodin and Katherine Stone have written particularly
effective critiques of this sort.72 Other critics chide the Gilmer
Court for failing to look beyond the surface of the rules for arbitration proceedings to which Gilmer was subject.73 Professor Alleyne,
himself a distinguished arbitrator, recently published a devastating
analysis of the realities of employment dispute arbitration under
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 64.
See id. at 66 n.105.
See id.at 79-80.
See id. at 70.

70. See Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitrationof Public-

Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL L. Rv. 635, 638-39; Gray, supra note 54, at 113 (providing a
management educator's comments).

71. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 54, at 28; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENv. U. L. REv. 1017, 1044 (1996) (including one section headed "Due Process or Cowboy

Arbitrations?").
72. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 54, at 28; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 71, at 1044.
73. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory DiscriminationClaims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in

the Arbitration Forum, 13 HoFsnrR LAB.L.J. 381 (1996).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss2/2

10

Covington: Employment
Employment
Arbitration
After
Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to th
Arbitration
After
Gilmer

1998]

those New York Stock Exchange rules.7 4 Some academic commen-

tators have been generally sympathetic to Gilmer, citing its advantages of relative speed and low cost.75 The most severe criticism
from the academic community has centered on the approval of
making the agreement to arbitrate a condition of getting a job.7 6 It
is true that the language of the opinion seems to go further than
needed on this point. After all, neither employer nor employee had
meaningful control over the presence of the arbitration provision in
the New York Stock Exchange rules, and the nature of the
employer's business made it truly necessary that both employer and
broker be registered with the Exchange.77 Thus the "condition"
that was imposed on Mr. Gilmer was imposed more by an external
force than by his firm's independent decision. Justice White's opinion may therefore be unduly broad when it states that "inequality in
bargaining power, [between employers and employees], is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable in the employment context."7 8 The language indicating
that only fraud or coercion by the employer would justify nonenforcement seems irrelevant.7 9 Neither employer nor employee

had the power to do away with the NYSE rule."° In fact, however,
Justice White's opinion closes his discussion of this point in a characteristically cautious way, saying that a "claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases."" 1 Such claims
are not foreclosed, and it remains open to the lower federal courts
to begin working out the specifics of what counts as abuse of the
employer's economic power.
B. Judicial Response: Acceptance, With Increasing Notes
of Caution
For the most part, the lower federal courts have welcomed Gilmer with open arms.2 Crowded dockets may well account for some
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Divergent Strategies: Union Organization and

Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1994 LAB. L.J. 465, 468; Schwartz, supra note 64, at 60-61.
76. See, e.g., Alleyne, supra note 73, at 383; Grodin, supra note 54, at 29.

77. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
78. Id. at 33.

79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id. at 23.
Id. at 33.
See, e.g., Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
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of this. Whatever the reason, the federal judiciary has extended the
application of Gilmer to a variety of other federal labor protections
such as Title VII,83 ERISA,1 and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. 5 The Second Circuit applied the broad presumption of
arbitrability to an anti-retaliation provision in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act.86
Is the extension of the Gilmer rationale to these other statutes
proper? In recognizing that there is now a very strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the answer must be "yes." Since rights
under antitrust statutes, securities laws, and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act have all been found appropriate for the arbitration forum by the Supreme Court, there can be no doubt that the
policy favoring arbitration is very strong indeed. There are, however, some distinctions among the enforcement histories of various
statutes that might merit closer attention. Take, for example, the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),87 the basic wage and hour law.
The Ninth Circuit recently approved mandatory arbitration for
FLSA claims in Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co.8" A federal district
court in Texas had reached the same result in 1993.9 In neither
case did the court refer to the long history of refusing to honor
private settlements of wage claims entered into by employers and
employees in the absence either of Department of Labor supervision or court approval. 9° That is, of course, a pre-Gilmer history,
but it is grounded in a reality that is as much with us today as earlier: employees who have an ongoing relationship with the
employer are not well placed to complain about either the substance or the procedure of that employer's offer to settle relatively
smaller claims.91 As it happens, both the cases requiring arbitration
83. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11th Cir. 1992).
84. See, e.g., Laniok v. Advisory Comm. of the Brainerd Mfg. Co. Pension Plan, 935 F.2d
1360, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991).

85. See, e.g., Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 877, 883 (9th
Cir. 1992).

86. See Oldroyd v. Elmira Savings Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1998)
(interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (1994)).
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).

88. 84 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1996).
89. See Hampton v. IT Corp., 829 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
90. See, e.g., Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.
1982) (holding that settlements for back wages will not be given judicial approval where the
agreement was reached without supervision by the Department of Labor).
91. See Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 709-711 (1945).
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of FLSA claims under Gilmer involved former rather than current
employees. 92 Even so, it would have been welcome for the opinions to note that settlement of such claims has long been regarded
as not a strictly private matter.
One other extension of the Gilmer opinion by the Fourth Circuit
has drawn criticism and has been rejected by other circuits.93 In
that case an individual employee was required to arbitrate a statutory claim under arbitration procedures created under a collective
bargaining agreement. 94 The agreement's arbitration clause was
broad enough to cover statutory claims,9" and thus distinguishable
from the agreement in Gardner-Denver. The other circuit courts
that have considered the issue have all held that Gilmer is applicable only to individual contracts of employment, not collective
agreements.9 6
The general attitude of the federal courts has thus been to welcome the Gilmer outcome, and to extend it. In the process, however, the courts have begun to note the existence of serious
questions about just how to apply that rationale, and some have
sounded notes of caution.97 The next two sections of this article
address a pair of questions that courts must answer when they are
asked to order arbitration in employment law cases. What is the
scope of the FAA "contracts of employment" exception? 98 What
defects in the execution or content of an arbitration agreement
should lead a court to deny enforcement of the promise? 99

92. See Kuehner, 84 F.3d at 318; Hampton, 829 F. Supp. at 203.
93. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
But see Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997); Harrison v.
Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).

94. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885.
95. See id. at 885-86.
96. See Brisentine,117 F.3d at 526; Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1453; Pryner v. Tractor Supply
Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 295 (1997); Varner v. National
Super Mkts. Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 946 (1996). The

Supreme Court may soon resolve the split in an ADA case. See Wright v. Universal
Maritime Servs., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998).
97. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (offering the

most searching opinion to date that addresses the issues).
98. See discussion infra Part III.
99. See discussion infra Part IV.
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C. CongressionalReaction
Formal Congressional reaction to Gilmer can be summarized in a
single word: None. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does indeed
include a provision encouraging voluntary arbitration, 100 but that
provision was already in the Bill at the time the House Labor and
Education Committee issued its report on April 24, 1991, two
weeks before the Gilmer decision was announced. 101 Since 1991
there have been bills introduced to overrule or modify Gilmer, but
none has passed.'02
D. Executive Agency Response
Two agencies have responded unfavorably to one aspect of the
Gilmer opinion; 03 the part of Justice White's opinion that found no
problem with the fact that the plaintiff was required to execute an
agreement to arbitrate as a condition of employment. 10 4 As
pointed out earlier, that was not done directly by the employer in
Gilmer.0 5- The employer simply required that Gilmer register with
the New York Stock Exchange. 10 6 The Exchange imposed the arbitration requirement.0 7 Both the EEOC and the General Counsel
of the NLRB have expressed strong disapproval of an employer
practice requiring that employees agree to arbitrate statutory claims
as a condition of employment. 0 8 The General Counsel's office at
the NLRB has said that requiring a worker to enforce NLRA statutory rights through individual arbitration would constitute an unfair
labor practice. 09 The EEOC has issued a formal policy statement
100. See Pub. L. No. 102-166 §118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991) (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
101. See H.R. RaP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 97 (1991). The Report mentions the GardnerDenver decision, but does not refer to Gilmer at all. T"he same is true of the report from the
House Judiciary Committee, issued a few days after the Gilmer decision. See H.R. REP. No.
102-40, pt. 2, at 78 (1991).
102. One such bill was introduced by Representatives Markey (D-Mass.) and Morella (R-

Md.). See H.R. 983, 105th Cong. (1997).
103. See infra notes 110 and 112.
104. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
105. See id. at 23.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See infra notes 110 and 112.

109. See Bentley's Luggage Corp., 24 AMR
1997).

34028 (Aug. 21, 1995) (LRP Publ. June
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condemning the practice" 0 and has filed briefs opposing the practice in several pending cases."' In response to this chorus of disapproval, the National Association of Securities Dealers has proposed
to change its rules, so that a registering broker can decline to agree
to arbitrate statutory employment rights." 2 The proposal must be
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission before taking effect." 3 On the other hand, there is little, if any, opposition to
voluntary arbitration. The Department of Labor continues to go
forward with plans to foster voluntary arbitration of disputes
involving rights created by some of the statute it administers." 4

III. THE FAA "CoNTRAcrs

OF EMPLOYMENT" EXCEPTION

Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act defines two terms of art,
"maritime transaction" and "commerce." 1 15 Those two terms are
significant because section 2 of the statute identifies enforceable
agreements to arbitrate as those "in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ....
Both terms are given broad meaning. However, section 1 concludes
with an exclusionary clause: "but nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 7 The problem in interpreting this language is how to read
the last phrase, "workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.""'
Seafarers' employment agreements, known as "articles," are still regulated in great detail by statute.1 9 They are
110. See Gilbert F. Casellas, EEOC, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
DiscriminationDisputes as a Condition of Employment, 827 Fair. Empl. Pract Man. (BNA)

405:7511 (1997).
111. See id. at 405:7520-:7521.
112. See NASD Votes to Nix Mandatory Arbitration, Fair Empi. Prac. (BNA), Aug. 25,

1997, at 99.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Expanded Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Programs Administered by the Department of Justice, 62 Fed. Reg. 6690 (1997); DOL Seeks Comment on
Expanded ADR Program, 154 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 172 (Feb. 17, 1997).

115. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
116. Id. § 2.
117. Id. § 1.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §10304 (1994) (setting out in detail the form of agreement to be
used in foreign and intercoastal voyages); 46 U.S.C. §10502 (1994) (requiring employment
agreements for coastal voyages to be in writing and contain certain provisions). Neither of
these sections specifically refers to arbitration. While the precise terms of both sections are
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enforced through the peculiar procedures of admiralty. Railroad
workers are the subject of a special statute for their industry, the
Railway Labor Act 2 ° that contains its own provisions for arbitration.121 Representatives of seafarer and railroad worker unions
sought exclusion from the FAA. 22 Thus the reference to both
those industries is fully understandable, as well as textually clear.
The same cannot be said of the concluding phrase. There was precious little federal statutory protection for employees in general in
1925, and that would remain the case for another decade.
A.

The Gilmer Dissent and Precedentin the Lower
Federal Courts

The majority opinion in Gilmer does not address the question of
how to interpret this language.'2 3 The issue was not raised by the
discharged worker at an early enough stage. 24 Justice Stevens
relatively recent, they reflect a practice of close regulation of seafarer articles that has existed
for well over a century. See H.R. REP. No. 93-338 at 117 (1983). "S.46 is for the most part a
restatement of the existing maritime safety and seamen protection laws ...

."

Id.

120. 45 U.S.C. § §151-188 (1994). Although this statute was not enacted until 1926, while
the FAA became law in 1925, similar provisions authorizing "boards of adjustment" to
resolve grievances were already in place under Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920.
See 41 Stat. 456, 469-474 (1920); see Jonathon A. Cohen & James K. Lobesenz, Grievance
Resolution and the System Board of Adjustment, 25 ALI-ABA 299, 301-302, Oct. 23, 1997.
Moreover, participants in the Arbitration Act debates were no doubt aware that some form
of regulation resembling the Railway Labor Act would soon be in force.
121. 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, 157-159 (1994). Section 153 pertains to Railroad Adjustment
Boards, and sections 157-159 pertain to arbitration. See id.
122. See Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United EIec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452
(1953).
123. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 38-40 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
124. The opinion also justifies not addressing the issue on the ground that the arbitration
agreement appears in a registration application rather than in a "contract of employment,"
but one should not rely too heavily on that casual dicta. Since employment is by definition
contractual, and since the terms of a typical employment relationship change with the
passage of time, the notion that one can find all the terms of an employment contract in a
single document is not one to take seriously. That is doubtless not implied by Justice White
here. The peculiarities involved in applying for registration as a stock broker as an
individual, and in being a member firm of an exchange or association of dealers result in both
the firm (the employer) and the individual broker (the employee) pledging to the exchange
(or association of dealers) that each will arbitrate disputes with the other. Thus the exchange
or association of dealers could change its arbitration rules and eliminate the arbitration duty
without the specific consent of either employer or employee. That, indeed, is in the process
of happening with respect to employment disputes in the industry. Since neither employer
nor employee can control the nature of the duty to arbitrate it makes sense not to say this
promise is "incorporated into" the employment contract. This does not mean that the simple
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nonetheless considered the issue in his dissent. That opinion argues
that the exception should be read broadly, so that FAA arbitration
would not be available in employer-employee cases.' 2 5 Among
other arguments, he notes that prior to the Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 12 6 that held arbitration agreements in collective bargaining agreements to be enforceable under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 2 7 three Circuit Courts of
28
Appeals had applied the exception to those types of contracts.Y
Precedent in the lower federal courts does not generally support
Justice Stevens's position, however. There has been a trend in
recent years to restrict the FAA section 1 exception to contracts of
employees in the transportation industry. The seminal case is Tenney Engineering,Inc. v. United ElectricalRadion & Machine Workers. 2 9 In Tenney, a labor union sought a stay of an action for
damages brought against it by an employer, in order to arbitrate the
employer's claim under a clause in the employer's arbitration
agreement. 30 The Supreme Court had not yet held that section 301
of Taft-Hartley authorized enforcement of arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements, and the court therefore looked to
the FAA as the only source of power to grant the union's
request. 13 1 By a vote of five to two, the court held that the FAA
granted the federal district court power to require the employer to
arbitrate. 132 The employer's argument that section 1 excepted
employment contracts, including collective agreements, from the
FAA was rejected. 133 The opinion, by Judge Mars, noted that the
legislative history of the exception was scant.1 34 He cited a report
by an American Bar Association committee, which had been heavlocation of the pledge to arbitrate in a document not labeled "employment contract" has any

particular significance.
125. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
128. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). It is interesting to note that Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion in Gilmer cites another Third Circuit opinion as support for his view that the section
1 exception should be read broadly. That case involved transportation workers. See
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951).
130. See Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 451.
131. See id. at 453.
132. See id. at 454.
133. See id. at 453.
134. See id. at 452.
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ily involved in drafting the Bill that ultimately became the FAA,
saying that
[o]bjections to the bill were urged by Mr. Andrew Fusureth as
representing the Seamen's Union, Mr. Fusureth taking the position that seamen's wages came within admiralty jurisdiction and
should not be subject to an agreement to arbitrate. In order to
eliminate this opposition, the committee consented to an amendment to Section 1....
From this, Judge Mars reasoned that the intent underlying the
exclusion was a very narrow one. 136 He then applied the maxim
ejusdem generis to construe the language "any other class of workers" to refer only to workers who, like seamen and railroad workers, are "actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign
commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to be in practical
effect part of it."' 3 7

Criticism of Judge Maris's opinion was not long in coming. Professor Cox quickly pointed out that the opinion led to a very
strange reading of two adjoining sections of the FAA. "Commerce" was being read broadly in section 2, but very narrowly in
section 1.138 Moreover, while the Tenney majority opinion correctly
points out that the legislative history of the exception is scant, there
are other statements in the record indicating that arbitration of
labor contract disputes was never contemplated. 39
The Fourth Circuit specifically refused to accept the Tenney analysis, in United Electrical,Radio & Machine Workers v. Miller Metal
ProductsInc.,14 0 also a case in which an employer was seeking damages for breach of a collective agreement, and also decided before
135. Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 452.

136. See id.
137. Id.

138. See Archibald Cox, GrievanceArbitration in the FederalCourts, 67 HARV. L. REV.
591 (1954). It is clear, he argues, that § 1 was intended to govern § 2. See id. 593-94.
139. See id. at 455 & n.17 (McLauglin, J., dissenting) (pointing to three passages in the
Congressional Record, in which the Bill is said to provide for arbitration in commercial
contracts). In Professor Finkin's recent article urging a broad reading of the exemption, he
quotes from the testimony of W.H.H. Piatt, of the American Bar Association, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee in Jan. 1923: "It is not intended that this shall be an act referring
to labor disputes, at all." Matthew W. F'mkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States
Arbitration Act: An Essay in HistoricalClarification,17 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAD. L. 282,
285 (1996).
140. 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954).
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Lincoln Mills. 4 ' In dicta, however, the Supreme Court has indi-

cated it might have less difficulty in ordering specific performance
of an agreement to arbitrate in an individual contract of employment. 42 The First, 143 Second, 144 Sixth, 145 and Seventh 46 Circuits
have all accepted the Tenney analysis. The District of Columbia
Circuit joined this group in 1997 in its Cole decision. 47
Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc,148 ("Arce") a recent federal district court opinion, rejects Tenney vigorously. The Arce
court begins by arguing that the language of the section 1 exclusion
includes no ambiguity that requires resorting to legislative history.149 If there is ambiguity, however, then it is appropriate to
begin one's analysis by looking at the fact that the Congress chose
to exclude from the scope of the FAA all those employment contracts that would have been thought in 1925 to fall within the scope
of the Congressional power to legislate. 50 When one couples this
with the fact that the principal impetus for this legislation was to
provide for arbitration in deals between businesses, the result is to
hold that contracts of employment simply do not fit within the
5
statute.' '
B. ReasonableAlternative Interpretations
What is a proper reading of this exception? One problem is that
the definition of "commerce" in section 1 of the FAA is tautological, "commerce" is defined by using the word "commerce":
"commerce," as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any
141. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
142. See United Elec. 215 F.2d at 221.

143. See Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971).
144. See Erring v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972).
145. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592,597-98 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
prior Sixth Circuit dicta).
146. See Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 150,
351 F.2d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Katten, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
147. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
148. 883 F. Supp. 117, 120-21 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
149. See id. at 121.
150. See id. at 123.

151. See id.
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State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and
any State or Territory or foreign nation .... 152
The Tenney court was quite right in pointing out that the concept
of "commerce" in 1925 was different from the concept of "commerce" applied in the court after 1936.153 The Tenney suggestion
that only those employees engaged in the movement of goods or
people would have been viewed as "engaged in commerce" in 1925,
however, goes too far. 154 While the notion that major league baseball is, not; "commerce," as the Supreme Court held in 1922,155
seems odd indeed; the Court had long since expanded the notion of
commerce to include sending messages by wire 156 or operating1 57a
correspondence school whose students resided in multiple states.
Moreover, as the district court pointed out in Arce, the choice
Congress made in 1925 was to exclude from the scope of the FAA
all contracts of employment that they felt would lie within their
power to regulate, namely workers engaged in the movement of
goods.' 58 Viewed in this way, the exclusion from coverage should
be interpreted to be as broad as the category of employment contracts within the sphere of Congressional power today. Succinctly
put, "contract evidencing a transaction commerce" language in section 2 is interpreted in the broader sense in which "commerce" is
currently regarded. 5 9
There is, finally, the clear focus of the advocates of this legislation
on "commercial contracts," contracts of merchants and traders.
The readiness with which the ABA committee pushing the statute
agreed to exclude employment contracts indicates 60how little interest there was in arbitrating employment disputes.'
On the whole, Justice Stevens, Professor Cox, Professor Finkin,
and other academic commentators and federal district courts like
the court in Arce, would seem to have the better argument: that the
152. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
153. See Tenny Eng'g, Inc., v. United Elec. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450, 453 (1953).
154. Id. at 463.
155. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Prof'l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922).
156. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 106 (1918); Pensacola Tel. Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 1 (1878).
157. See International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 93 (1910).
158. See Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117,122 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
159. See id.
160. See id.
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Federal Arbitration
Act was not meant to cover contracts of
161
employment.
The logical appeal of that position, however, runs counter to a
very strong trend by courts favoring the use of alternative dispute
resolution techniques. That policy is given such weight these days,
as evidenced by the large number of courts approving Tenney;
despite weaknesses in the opinion that have been widely pointed
out that some sort of narrow reading of the section 1 exception may
well be the end result. 162
Is there a "narrow" reading of the section 1 exception that is less
objectionable than restricting it entirely to transportation workers?
Another argument in the Tenney opinion may have a sounder basis.
Judge Mars notes that thirteen years after the enactment of the
FAA, Congress passed the federal wage and hour law, 63 the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA").' 6 4 The duties to pay the
minimum wage and premium pay for overtime were imposed to
benefit any employee who "in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce."' 16 5 If "engaged
in commerce" in section 1 of the FAA is read to mean roughly the
same thing as FLSA, it is not necessary to think of "commerce" in a
narrow fashion. The term can have the same meaning in both section 1 and section 2, surely a desirable result. The exception then
means that the FAA is available to handle disputes involving those
employees who are engaged in "production" but not those involved
in "commerce."
Who are these? Since the FLSA was amended in 1961 to make
coverage depend primarily on whether one works for an "enterprise" in commerce, 6 6 there have been very few cases interpreting
161. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 138; Matthew W. F'mkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the
United States Arbitration Act An Essay in Historical Clarification,17 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 282, 298 (1996).

162. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997). Judge
Posner acknowledges the force of much of what Professor Finkin has written, but goes on to

say that to read the section one exclusion by giving the term commerce its "modem
meaning" would "give the exclusion a breathtaking scope." See id. Thus, Judge Posner
accepts the Tenney limitation of the exclusion to transportation employees. See also Schulte
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 225,231 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that ambiguities in arbitration

clauses are to be read in favor of requiring a party to go forward with arbitration).
163. See Tenney Eng'g, 207 F.2d at 453.

164. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
165. Id. § 206(a).
166. See id. § 203(r)(1).
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the "engaged in commerce" phrase. Prior to that, however, the
cases were numerous. Those covered under this language included,
for example, stockroom workers who handle goods ordered from
out of state in contemplation of their sale to known repeat customers,167 construction workers rebuilding roads used to carry freight
from state to state,'168 and a clerical employee working up his
employer's out-of-state purchasing orders every week. 1 69 What
about a financial institution employee who spends a large part of
each day at the computer sending messages to exchanges in New
York, London, and Frankfurt, relaying the decisions of customers
phoned in from cities around the country? To deny that such an
employee is "engaged in commerce" would seem hard to defend.
C. Post-Gilmer Legislation
Have post-Gilmer amendments to employment laws shifted the
balance of the argument? Section 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
provides:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use
of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding,
mini[-]trials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
under70the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this
1
title.
What influence should this have, if any, on interpreting the section 1 exception?
Professor Abrams reasons that the probable intent of the drafters
of this statute was the same intent associated with nearly identical
language in other statutes. 7 ' That is to indicate to the federal
courts that arbitration of a case should be regarded as appropriate
even if rights under one of the statutes should happen to be
167. See Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, (1943).
168. See Aistate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953); Overstreet v. North Shore
Corp., 315 U.S. 125 (1943).

169. See W'irtz v. C & P Shoe Corp., 336 F.2d 21, 27 (5th Cir. 1964).
170. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
1981 (1991)).
171. See Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrabilityin Recent FederalCivil Rights Legislation: The
Need for Amendment, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 521 (1994). The argument is also made by Judge
Gertner, of the District of Massachusetts, who refused to enforce a pre-dispute agreement to

arbitrate in a Title VII case recently. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 76 FEP Cases 681 (D. Mass. 1998).
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involved.'7 2 This was thought necessary for many years because of
the Supreme Court's perceived hostility to arbitration of statutory
issues in its 1953 opinion in Wilko v. Swann.173 Abrams argues that
the legislative history of the language makes it clear that the drafters intended that arbitration be available as a supplement for judicial remedies, not a replacement for litigation in court.1 74 He
therefore argues, for instance, that de novo judicial review should
continue to be available after an arbitrator's decision. 1 75 If Professor Abrams's interpretation is right (he makes a very strong case
for his position), then this language does no more than what the
Gilmer decision itself did; remove from federal jurisprudence any
hostility toward arbitration of cases involving statutory rights that
might still reflect the Wilko rationale. It does not bear at all on how
the section 1 exception should be read.
As Professor Abrams points out, however, the congressional
intent issue is clouded to some degree by an interpretive memorandum inserted by Senator Dole of Kansas. 76 That memorandum
states that the provision "encourages the use of alternative means
of dispute resolution, including binding arbitration.... 77 By slip
ping in the word "binding" before "arbitration," a term that does
not appear in the text of the statute, it becomes possible to argue
that judicial review is precluded except on the limited basis provided by the FAA itself.
If a stockbroker in Gilmer's position comes before the Supreme
Court again in a similar action and raises the section 1 exception,
the Court must choose among several options. First, it could accept
Tenney, thus giving "commerce" different meanings in adjacent
locations. 7 8 Second, it could agree with Justice Stevens, Professors
Cox and Finkin, and others that all employment contracts are
exempt from the FAA, thus undoing the practical impact of Gil172. See id. at 554-55; cf.Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 513, 104
Stat. 327 (1990). Section 513 of the Americans with Disabilities Act is for the most part
identical with the later 1991 Civil Rights Act provision.
173. 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (holding the legislative history of the Securities Act indicated
that an agreement to arbitrate would be void); overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/

American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
174. See Abrams, supra note 171, at 558.
175. See Abrams, supra note 171, at 559-60.
176. See Abrams, supra note 171, at 557.
177. See Abrams, supra note 171, at 557 (emphasis added).
178. See supra notes 136-39.
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mer.179 Third, the Supreme Court may adopt an intermediate reading of "workers engaged in commerce" based on the FLSA cases,
thus widening the exception beyond the Tenney reading but applying the FAA to the great majority of employment.180 Finally, they
may find that Congress in the last several years has modified the
exception in the 1925 Act to give it greater breadth. 8 ' While none
of these is a totally satisfying outcome, one hopes the Court will
avoid the first option. To adopt inconsistent readings of "commerce" is sufficiently discomforting so that it ought to be done only
if the text or other clear Congressional statement requires that
result.
D. Does the FAA Exception Really Matter?
If an employment dispute is not subject to binding arbitration
under federal law, but is subject to binding arbitration under state
law, the end result is the same. Section 1 of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is
valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. This
act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and
employees or between their respective representatives [unless
otherwise provided in the agreement].'82
More than thirty states have now enacted this statute, 83 and the
majority of them have enacted it without any change to the language of this section." 4 Since the law of so many states is now as
receptive to arbitration as is federal law, does the Federal Arbitration Act's section 1 exception for worker contracts really merit
much attention? I believe that it most certainly does.
First, to the extent that arbitrability is made a matter of federal
law, states lose the opportunity to decide a policy issue about which
179.
(1954).
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Archibald Cox, GrievanceArbitrationin the FederalCourts, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 591
See supra notes 160-62.
See Abrams, supra note 171, at 556-60.
173 UNiE. APa. Acr. § 1, 7 U.L.A 6 (1955) (emphasis in original).
See id. at 6-10.
See id.
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they have traditionally had the last say. At one time or another,
Arizona, 85 Arkansas, s6 Idaho, 87 and Kansas' 88 have excepted
employment contracts from the application of this statute. The two
Carolinas provide that the statute applies to employer-employee
contracts only if the contracts specifically provide so, 189 and Missouri has excepted contracts of adhesion from operation of the
Act. 9 ° As the Supreme Court made clear in J.I. Case Co. v.
NLRB' 9 ' many years ago, most individual contracts of employment
as well as contracts of hire are created under state contract law.
Suits for breach of these agreements have been decided by applying
that state law.' 92 The state law respecting employment contracts
has been changing in many ways in recent years.' 93 If a state wishes
to keep its courts actively involved in fashioning the details of those
changes, it should be allowed to do so.
Second, just because both a federal and a state forum may have
policies favoring arbitration does not mean that they will be administered in the same way. A state court asked to send a case to an
arbitral forum may insist that the moving party demonstrate the
regularity of procedures in that forum by more than a citation to a
body of rules. Professor Alleyne has demonstrated that the
Supreme Court's acceptance of the New York Stock Exchange rules
simply on their face may have reflected a less than adequate understanding of how those rules work in practice.1 94 At this point, the
position the federal courts will take as to the adequacy of an arbitration forum before entrusting statutory rights to its care is still
being worked out. Surely, state courts are entitled to participate in
185. See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-1517 (1962).
186. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie 1981).
187. See IDAHo CODE § 7-901 (1975).
188. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1987).
189. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1.567.1 (1973); S.C. CODE ANrN. §15-48-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976)
(noting that an arbitration agreement is subject in part to the parties assent).
190. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435-50 (West 1980).
191. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
192. See id. at 340 (explaining that individual employment contracts are not within the
scope of the NLRA).
193. See Steven F. Biskup, Trends in Section 1981 Employment DiscriminationLaw, the
Patterson Case: Progeny and Prognosis,8 J. AM. CoiP. CouNs. Ass'N 20 (1990).
194. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory DiscriminationClaims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in
the Arbitration Forum, 13 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 414 (1996); See also Employment
Discrimination: How Registered Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes, Letter
Report, GAO/HEHS 94-17 (Mar. 30, 1994) (criticizing exchange arbitration).
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that process, given the number of states that have enacted their own
discrimination laws.
IV.

SETTING STANDARDS FOR DECIDING WHAT AGREEMENTS

To

ARBITRATE ARE ENFORCEABLE

A.

Introduction

Now that suits to enforce arbitration agreements under Gilmer
have become more common, the federal courts have found themselves deciding just what questions need to be answered before
granting or denying these requests. This has meant evaluating both
arguments about the content of arbitration clauses, as well as the
circumstances in which some of the alleged agreements have been
made. Several thoughtful opinions focus on whether it is important
that an agreement to arbitrate be knowingly made, and just what
level of awareness might be required. Others have asked traditional
contract law questions about whether consideration has been given
in exchange for a promise to arbitrate. At least one case, Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc.,195 raises the question of whether the FAA precludes applying general state standards of unconscionability to a
contract to arbitrate. 196 The most significant recent developments
concern how far, if at all, a court should inquire into the adequacy
of the proposed arbitration forum to handle a particular claim. A
central point in all these cases, although sometimes implied rather
than express, is that the threshold issue of arbitrability remains a
matter for judicial scrutiny."

7

B. "Knowing" Waiver of ProceduralRights
In PrudentialInsurance Co. of America v. Lai,191 the Ninth Circuit held that a waiver of access to a judicial forum for enforcement
of Title VII statutory rights must be a knowing waiver. 19 9 Lai
involved a registration form used by members of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), familiarly known as the U4.120 The U-4 form is similar to the one executed by the plaintiff in
195.
196.
197.
there is
198.
199.
200.

12 INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTs CASES 684 (1997).
See id. at 695-96.
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (noting that
no special standard governing review of district court's arbitration decisions).
42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1305.
See id. at 1301.
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Gilmer, but varies slightly in wording. In Lai, the employees had
signed the form after being told it was necessary in order for them
to take a "test" that was required before they could work for the
employer.2° ' They were not given the NASD manual that would
have explained the meaning and effect of the arbitration clause.20 2
Even had they received the manual, the court indicated, it was
unlikely that the workers would have recognized the possibility that
they were agreeing to arbitrate employment rights.203 In many contexts, we accept the notion that a person who executes a document
without reading it, takes the risk that the document includes things
not specifically brought to the signer's attention. In the case of
Title VII, however, the "public policy of protecting victims of sexual
discrimination and harassment through the provision of Title VII
and analogous state statutes" is sufficiently strong to require that
any waiver of a substantive or a procedural right under that statute
be conscious and deliberate. 2" That public policy, the court reasoned, "is at least as strong as our public policy in favor of arbitration."20 5 The Ninth Circuit reiterated this position in Renteria v.
Prudential Insurance Co.2"6 The Seventh Circuit has said that it
agrees with this position so far as "substantive" provisions of Title
VII are concerned, but declined to take a position on waivers of a
judicial forum.20 7 Some district courts have rejected Lai, insisting
that the usual principle that one is bound by what he or she signs is
as applicable to waivers of judicial forum for Title VII as to waivers
of any other right.20 '
The fidelity of the Lai opinion to Justice White's opinion in Gilmer, and the calculated wordings of legislative memoranda accom201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 1305.
204. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
205. Id. at 1305.
206. 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997).
207. See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir.
1997).
208. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., - F. Supp. -, 1997 WL 325792, at *4
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that the case is distinguishable from Lai and that "Seus's
misunderstanding of the clause's scope will not excuse her contractual obligations under the
Form U-4"); Beauchamp v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (choosing not to treat Lai as persuasive precedent and holding that "a party is
generally chargeable with knowledge of the existence and scope of an arbitration clause
within a document signed by that party ....).
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panying the 1991 Civil Rights Acts, memoranda from both sides of
the aisle, strongly suggest that the Ninth Circuit's attitude should
prevail.2 °9 Those opinions do not, after all, require that a worker
who signs an arbitration agreement need to know all that much,
only that the agreement extends to employment rights. There is a
tradition in much of labor and employment law that waiver of public rights is either not allowed at all210 or is to be done only under
strict safeguards.2 1 That tradition of discouraging waiver has, as
the Seventh Circuit has noted, been applied ordinarily to substantive rather than adjective law rights.2 12
Is there reason to extend it as the Ninth Circuit has done? 213 At
least two reasons exist for thinking this is proper. First, given the
importance Congress has attached to making jury trials available to
workers who suffer from discrimination, it would not go too far to
require so basic a level of awareness.2 14 Second, employment law,
particularly discrimination law, is an area in which adjective law,
rules of procedure, concepts of burdens of persuasion and the like
are very tightly interwoven with the substantive rights involved.2 1 5
Consider the 1991 Civil Rights Act.21 6 Some of the most hard
fought provisions in that statute concern the order and allocation of
burdens of proof. 2 17 A court asked to entrust a substantive right
under such a statute to a forum that has traditionally paid less
attention to the niceties of legal procedure and rules of evidence
may therefore sensibly require that the agreement to accept the
arbitrator's judgment be made with at least some level of awareness
218
of what one is doing.
The approach taken in Lai is also consistent with traditional contract law principles.21 9 It is true, as the district court opinions
declining to follow Lai point out, that the law ordinarily holds peo209. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
210. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974).
211. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994) (listing
restrictions on waivers).

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Daniels v. Pipe Fitters Ass'n, 113 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1997).
See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 1305.
See id.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).

217. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994) (dealing with burdens of proof in disparate

impact cases).
218. See Pipe Fitters, 112 F.3d at 685; Lai, 42 F.3d at 1299.
219. See

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 5

(1979).
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ple to the terms of contract memorials they sign, even if they do not
read them.2 2 ° It is also true that individuals are held to the reasonable expectation that a party would have after reading the document.22 1 If one views the Rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers as incorporated by reference into the registration
form and treat a registrant as having read those rules, then what?
The Ninth Circuit very sensibly suggests applying the familiar doctrine that one reads a written contract as a whole.2 2 2 The thrust of
the NASD document predominantly focuses on matters dealing
with selling stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. 223 To
read the disputes settlement clauses as having to do with that class
of disputes is perfect in keeping with traditional contract interpretation principles. Suppose, however, that one could reasonably argue
that the rule on dispute settlement could be read two ways: either
as limited to disputes about the sales of securities or as covering a
broader range of disputes. What then?
The Ninth Circuit's approach is still in keeping with the traditions
of contract law. When a party is required to accept the terms of a
contract on a strict "take it or leave it" basis, we speak of the contract as a contract of adhesion.22 4 The terms of such a contract are
regularly construed against the party who proffers it, so that when
there are competing reasonable readings, the reading favoring the
position of the party who did not draft the agreement is the one to
be selected. 2 - This is particularly the case when the contract creates an ongoing relationship.22 6 Nor do we expect the bulk of outof-work job applicants to ask all that many questions about the
quirks of the forms used by the particular place that may be able to
provide the job he or she intensely needs.

220. See Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). See, e.g., Brookwood v. Bank of America, 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF COrNRAcrs § 211

(1979).
221. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 211.
222. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1302.
223. See NASD Manual.
224. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTriAcrs § 208.
225. See RESTAATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 206.
226. See E. Neil Young, Insurance ContractInterpretation:Issues and Trends, 625 INs. L.
71 (CCH) 1975.
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C. Interpretingthe Scope of the Promise To Arbitrate
In Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,2 7 the Seventh Circuit
found that the language of the U-4 arbitration clause did not cover
employment disputes, largely because of a inartful placing of a
colon. '2 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with this interpretation of
the language,229 but the Ninth Circuit agreed, as another basis for
its decision in Lai.30 Given the context in which the arbitration
provision appears in the Rules of the NASD, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned, it must be interpreted to apply to securities matters, not
employment disputes." 1 The language has since been modified to
refer explicitly to employment matters.3 2
D. Lack of Consideration
A promise to arbitrate future disputes, like any other promise, is
233
enforceable only if there is consideration given in exchange for it.
That is a familiar principle of state contract law, and to the extent
that the FAA does not displace state law, the ordinary law of the
state governs an agreement to arbitrate.234 Analyzing consideration issues may be more or less difficult depending on where the
alleged promise is found. Arbitration clauses appear in a number
of different places, including employee handbooks, application
forms, broker registration forms, as well as documents that purport
to be employment contracts. In the case of the broker registration
form, consideration is easy enough to find. The securities exchange
or dealer association involved gives the registrant access to trading
privileges in return for the registrant's bundle of promises to abide
by its rules.23s In two recent cases, however, one involving a handbook and one an application form, consideration for the employee's
227. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).

228. See id. at 1254-55.
229. See Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 32 F.3d 516, 519 (11th Cir. 1994).
230. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994).
231. See Farrand,993 F.2d at 1253.

232. See Schuetz v. First Boston Corp., No. 96 CIV.5557,1997 WL 452392, at *4 (S.D.N.Y
Aug. 8, 1997).
233. See RESTATE MNT (SEcoND) OF CoNmcrAcs § 206c (1979).

234. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
235. See Symposium, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Symposium on Arbitration in the
Securities Industry, 63 FoRDHvm L. Rev. 1501 (1995).
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alleged promise was found lacking. 36 The claimant in Gibson v.
Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc. 37 was hired on December 22,
1994, and told to report for work on January 9, 1995. 238 When she
arrived for her first day of work, she was given a stack of papers to
execute, including one called an "Associates Understanding."'' 39
This Understanding included the following language of waiver:
I agree to the grievance and arbitration provisions set forth in the
Associates Policy Manual. I understand that I am waiving my
right to a trial, including a jury trial, in state or federal court of
the class of disputes specifically set forth in the grievance and
240
arbitration provisions on pages [eight thru ten] of the Manual.
The "Manual" referred to was an "Associates Policy Manual," a
type of employee handbook.2 4 ' It included a disclaimer of the "reservation of rights" type:
[The employer] reserves the right at any time to modify, revoke,
suspend, terminate or change any or all terms of this Manual,
plans, policies, or procedures, in whole or in part, without having
to consult or reach agreement with anyone, at any time, with or
without notice....
While [the employer] intends to abide by the policies and procedures described in this Manual, it does not constitute a contract
nor promise of any kind. Therefore, employees can be terminated at any time, with or without notice ....
242
Given this disclaimer, the court reasoned, there was simply no
promise made by the employer that could serve as consideration for
the promise by the employee to use arbitration procedures rather
than litigate.2 43 Nor could the employer claim the promise to hire
served as consideration, since the employee had been hired weeks
before she executed the understanding. 44 A similar decision was
236. See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997);
Stewart v. Fairlane Community Health Ctr., 571 N.W.2d 542 (Mich. App. 1997).
237. 121 F.3d at 1126.

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See id. at 1128.
See id.
Id.
See Gibson, 121 F.3d at 1126.
Id. at 1128 (alterations in original).
See id. at 1131.
See id. at 1131.
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reached on much the 245
same facts in Stewart v. Fairlane Community
Centre.
Health
Mental
246
The potential employer in Brooks v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.
positioned its "Dispute Resolution Agreement" in the application
for employment. 47 When the claimant sued for violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866248 to protest an alleged discriminatory
refusal to hire her for a full time position, the defendant sought to
have the matter referred to arbitration.2 49 The Court agreed with
the claimant's argument that no consideration was given for her
promise to arbitrate- 0 The potential employer urged that considering her application was consideration.25 ' The court found that
was not sufficient, since the defendant in no way promised to consider the application if the applicant agreed to arbitration. 2 Thus,
at the time claimant signed the application, including the "agreement" to arbitrate, no consideration was given in exchange.2" 3 Several courts have held that a promise to consider an applicant could
serve as consideration, if given in exchange for the arbitration
promise.2 4
E. State Law UnconscionabilityPrinciples
Stirlen v. Supercuts, 5 like most Gilmer-connected cases thus far,
involved an employer's motion to compel an ex-employee to arbitrate a wrongful discharge claim based in part on statutory grounds,
in this instance, a provision of the state labor code." 6 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the
motion. 57 The court did so because it found the arbitration clause
to be "unconscionable" under state law. 8 The doctrine of uncon245. 571 N.W.2d 542 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the employers' arbitration
provision did not create an enforceable contract).
246. 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1838 (D. Md. 1997).

247. See iL at 1839.
248. 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1994).

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See Brooks, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1838.
See id. at 1841.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1839.

255. 12 Individual Employment Rights Cases 684 (1997).

256. See id. at 701.
257. See id. at 700-01.
258. See id.
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scionability is statutory in California, under a provision borrowed
from the Uniform Commercial Code.- 59 The court found this arbi-

tration agreement to be substantively unconscionable because it
was unduly one-sided; the employer retained the ability to pursue
remedies against the employee in court, but could, at its option,
require the employee to pursue any of his claims solely through
arbitration.26 The arbitration agreement also restricted the remedies available to the employee in arbitration. 6 '
Whether the California court was correct in finding that the FAA
does not preempt state law depends on one's reading of the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
2 6 2 There, the Court reversed
Casarotto.
a Montana decision that

refused to enforce an arbitration clause.26 3 The state court had
found the provision to be unconscionable because the clause failed
to conform to a state statute requiring arbitration clauses to be
especially prominent.2 64 Is the situation different in Stirlen because

the California unconscionability provision applies to all contracts,
rather than to arbitration agreements only?265 The language of
First Options calls for a "yes" answer, but one could argue that so
specific an application of the unconscionability doctrine to an arbitration agreement is in practice very much like the statute in Doctor's Associates.
F. Adequacy of the Alternative Forum
Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services2 66 addresses a different set of concerns: the adequacy of the procedures that would govern the arbitration, and whether the arbitral forum is available to
claimants at an affordable cost.267 The court held the arbitration
clause in the employment agreement enforceable, but only after
259. See CAt CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1994).
260. See Stirlen, 12 Individual Employment Rights Cases at 695.
261. See id. at 694. The employer also attempted to waive this restriction, but its waiver
was found ineffective. See id.
262. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
263. See id. at 689.
264. See id. at 687-88; see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (stating that notice of
arbitration must be typed on the first page of the contract).
265. See Stephen Ware, Arbitrationand UnconscionabilityAfter Doctor's Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FORSr L. REv. 1001 (1996).
266. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
267. See id. at 1481-82.
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interpreting one of the rules governing the arbitration to require
that employees cannot be required to pay for arbitration "in order
to pursue their statutory rights."2'68 The opinion was written by
Judge Harry Edwards,2 69 himself an arbitrator, under collective
bargaining agreements before being named to the bench, as well as
a well-known teacher of labor law and editor of coursebooks in the
field. In an early paragraph of the opinion, Judge Edwards states:
"We do not read Gilmer as mandating the enforcement of all
mandatory agreements to arbitrate statutory claims; rather, we read
Gilmer as requiring the enforcement of arbitration agreements that
do not undermine the relevant statutory scheme. The agreement in
this case meets that standard.""27
In order to decide whether the arbitration agreement met "that
standard," the majority opinion in Cole examines the rules under
which the matter would be heard; in this case the NationalRules for
the Resolution of Employment Disputes issued by the American
Arbitration Association in 1996.271 The opinion emphasizes several
aspects of the rules; providing for such discovery as the arbitrator
considers "necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues
.... ,272 The opinion must be in writing and signed by a majority of
the arbitrators.273 The arbitrator has broad power to grant relief.274
Then the opinion turns to the matter of allocating the costs of arbitration. 275 The AAA Rules provide for the parties to share the
expenses of the proceeding (apart from the arbitrator's fee), for the
initiating party to pay a $500 filing fee, which the arbitrator may
later allocate or the AAA may waive.2 7 6 The Rules are silent on
the allocation of the arbitrator's fee, which, Judge Edwards notes,
may be expected to run between $500 and $1,000 a day, but which
may be substantially more.27 7 The opinion poses the question:
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
just and
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 1468 (noting as well that employers will bear the cost of the arbitrator's fee).
See id. at 1466.
Id. at 1468 (emphasis in original).
See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480.
Id.
See id.
See id. ("The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems
equitable .....
See id. at 1481.
See id.
See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480-81.
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[I]f an employee ... is required to pay arbitrators' fees ranging
from $500 to $1,000 per day or more.., is it likely that he will not
be able to pursue his statutory claims? We think not.
Arbitration will occur in [Cole] only because it has been mandated by the employer as a condition of employment. Absent
this requirement, the employee would be free to pursue his
claims in court without having to pay for the services of a judge.
In such a circumstance-where arbitration has been imposed by
the employer and occurs only at the option of the employer278
arbitrators' fees should be borne solely by the employer.
Then, having supplied the gap in the AAA Rules on arbitrator fees,
the court orders the claimant to use the private forum. 279 A district
court in Colorado has agreed with the Cole majority on the fee
issue. 80
A district court judge in Massachusetts has allowed a plaintiff to
pursue a different line of attack: an argument based on allegations
about an arbitral forum's systematic bias.28 The claimant in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., sought relief for both age discrimination

(under the ADEA) and gender discrimination (under Title VII). 2
The former employer moved to stay the action and order arbitration, on the basis of a U-4 clause. 3 Claimant challenged the
motion on several grounds, including one based on the fact that an
overwhelming majority of securities industry arbitrators are middleaged to senior white males.' 4 The court, noting that this very fact
had worried the GAO in its 1994 review of this arbitration system, 5 denied the defendant's motion to require arbitration pending further development on this and other issues. 6 Judge Gertner
also expresses concern over whether these arbitrators lack the
power to award the expanded relief provided by the 1991 Civil
278. Id at 1484-85.
279. See id. at 1485.
280. See Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 74 Fair. Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 94 (D. Colo. 1997).
281. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Inc, 965 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass 1997).
282. See id. at 191.
283. See id. at 191-92.

284. See id. at 201.
285. See icl
286. See id. at 203.
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Rights Act, or to entertain claims under some of that Act's liability
provisions. 8 7
The question of adequate remedies is an important one. In
many, very likely most cases involving an individual claimant, the
remedy sought is likely to be monetary, and sometimes, a reinstatement order. Such a remedy requires no ongoing supervision. In
cases involving groups, on the other hand, many Title VII and
ADEA remedial orders have called for ongoing monitoring of hiring and promotion practices. The typical arbitrator is not set or is
even ambivalent to provide that sort of long-term supervision.288
This creates the possibility that a federal district court might find
itself asked to enforce an arbitrator's award over a period of time,
as circumstances change in the employer's business. When gaps or
ambiguities in the arbitrator's award appear, what is the court to
do? This suggests that the ability of a given arbitral forum to provide ongoing relief may be a significant factor in deciding whether
arbitration is appropriate, and that courts examining the question
may find the likelihood of the need for retained jurisdiction a reason not to order arbitration. One possible solution to the problem,
in some cases at least, may be a change in the attitude of arbitrators
about retaining jurisdiction. Professor John Dunsford, a former
president of the National Academy of Arbitrators, has recently suggested in an extensive article that the time has come for arbitrators
dealing with labor grievances to adopt the routine practice of
retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of being available to clarify
awards. 289 He reasons that section 6C of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes,
which calls for "definite" and "certain" awards should not prevent
routine retention of jurisdiction for this purpose.290 Not to be available to clarify an award can itself foster further disputes between
parties and delay enforcement of an award. 291 To the extent that
Professor Dunsford's attitude prevails in the employment arbitration community, this objection to arbitration loses some of its force.
287. See Rosenberg, 965 F. Supp at 199. Judge Gertner ultimately decided that the 1991
amendments demonstrate that the Congress does not intend pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate to be enforceable in Title VII cases. 76 F. Supp. 681 (D. Mass. 1998).
288. See John E. Dunsford, The Case for Retention of Remedial Jurisdiction in Labor
ArbitrationAwards, 31 GA. L. Rv. 201, 204 (1996).

289. See id. at 204-05.
290. See id. at 249-50.
291. See id. at 203.
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Some courts have reached the same result without benefit of an
explicit provision in a labor arbitrator's award retaining
jurisdiction. 292
Is this concern with the costs, procedures, and remedies in arbitration appropriate? Yes, for reasons similar to those that support
the Ninth Circuit's decision; agreements to arbitrate future employment disputes must be knowing.2 9 3 First, there is the reasonable
expectation of the employee who signs the agreement. Saying
"yes" to arbitration in no way implies consent to a loss of one's
substantive rights. We expect appraisers appointed to resolve disputes between insurers and insureds about the value of destroyed
property to apply the same principles that a court would.2 94 The
same expectation ought reasonably to apply in the employment
context.
But what if employer and employee knowingly agreed to decide
future disagreements by flipping a coin or throwing darts at a
board? It is this point that seems more important to the majority in
Cole. Their concern for not undermining the statutory scheme is
fully consistent with the strong tradition disfavoring waiver of statutory rights given employees vis--vis their employers by the Congress. A half century ago, the Court identified the reasons for this in
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil,2 95 a case involving a worker's
waiver of liquidated damages for a violation of the FLSA by his
employer. The "unequal bargaining power as between employer
and employee" led Congress to enact minimum wage protection. 96
The Court reasoned that "the same policy considerations which forbid waiver of the basic minimum ... also prohibit waiver of the
employee's right to liquidated damages.1"297 The Court also empha292. See e.g., Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 631 v. Silver State Disposal Serv., Inc., 109
F.3d 1409 (9th Cir. 1997). The court rejects arguments based on the language of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, and discusses cases from the Third Circuit applying Pennsylvania
law that would imply authority on the part of an arbitrator to complete an incomplete award

even over the objection of a party. See id. at 1412.
293. See Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 1997).

294. See generally Cole v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(stating that "[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than judicial, forum." (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
26 (1991))).
295. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
296. Id. at 706.
297. Id. at 707.
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sizes "the deterren[ce] effect which Congress plainly intended" the
damages provision to have.298 Finally, the Court reasoned that
"[a]n employer is not to be allowed to gain a competitive advantage
by reason of the fact that his employees are more willing to waive
claims... than are those of his competitor."2 99
G. Summary
These cases, taken as a group, demonstrate that at least some
federal courts are willing to take seriously the concerns about arbitration forum adequacy that Justice Powell expressed in GardnerDenver. 00 A claimant who mounts more than the generalized
objections made in Gilmer, therefore, has a good chance of getting
a full hearing on specific charges that he did not consent to arbitration knowingly or willingly, or that the proposed arbitration forum
is inadequate to provide relief, either because the forum lacks sufficient procedures or remedial powers, or because its panel of arbitrators is flawed by lack of assurances of competence or because the
panel is itself the product of discriminatory practices.
V.

DECIDING WHETHER

To

ENFORCE ARBITRATION AWARDS

Gilmer involved whether a federal court should order an unwilling party to go forward with arbitration.30 1 This issue of "arbitrability" was also the focus of the Gilmer dissent, 0 2 and of the
cases discussed in sections III and IV above. Once an arbitration is
concluded, new issues arise: Can a party who is pleased with the
outcome have the assistance of the courts in having the award
enforced? Can a party who is dissatisfied with the outcome of the
arbitration have the award modified or set aside? Assuming that
either can persuade a court to examine the procedures used in the
arbitration or the merits of the arbitrator's decision, what standard
of review is to be used? While these issues are different from
whether to order arbitration in the first place, many of the same
concerns are present.
298. Id. at 710.
299. Id.
300. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

301. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-27, 36 (1991).
302. See id. at 36.
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A necessary starting point, of course, is the statute itself. Section

9 gives the federal courts jurisdiction to "confirm" awards. 0 3 Sections 10304 and 11305 provide for vacating or correcting awards. It is
immediately obvious that the words of the statute call for the courts
to play a limited role in cases that have gone to arbitration. 316 It is

equally obvious that these words do not require federal district
courts to roll over and play dead.307 Language, such as "undue
means" and "other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced," is elastic enough to permit the development
of meaningful minimum standards of fairness. 30 8
303. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
304. See id. § 10. Section 10 provides in part:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration (1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
305. See id. § 11. Section 11 states:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration (a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in
the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them,
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and
promote justice between the parties.
Id.
306. See id. §§ 9-11.
307. See id.
308. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
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A.

Types of Standards of Review

The examination of the work of one tribunal by another takes
many different forms and employs many different standards. The
most common instance is review of the work of a lower court by
another court that ranks higher - what we typically refer to as
"appellate review." The term "review" is typically used in this sort
of hierarchical setting, and thus may seem to imply a "higher tribunal-lower tribunal" relationship. That is obviously not the case
here, nor is it the case in all other settings. Many statutes call for
the courts to review the quasi-judicial work of administrative agencies.309 The work of private judges - the class to which arbitrators
belong - has also been subject to court examination for many
years.3 10 The 1943 standard fire insurance form,31' for example,
provides that if an insurer and insured cannot agree about the value
of a loss the insured has suffered, either can demand that the issue
be settled by an appraisal procedure chaired by a disinterested
umpire. Challenges to the work of these panels have been relatively
rare, but also regular. 1 2 Thus when one speaks of "review" of arbitration awards, that should not be read to imply a "higher-lower"
relationship within a single system of tribunals. Arbitrator jurisdiction exists in these employment law cases by virtue of agreement,
not because of grant of public power. The term is so commonly
used, however, that it seems sensible to use it, but with the caution
that this examination of the arbitrator's work has a different function from the examination of a lower court's work.
The answers to two major questions define the scope of review:
(1) what segments of the first decision-making are to be examined?
and (2) how critically does the reviewing court inquire into whether
the first tribunal decided the case properly?
Neither question is all that easy. Take the first: What segments of
the prior decision-making are to be reviewed? How ought we go
309. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994) (providing that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a final
order of the [National Labor Relations] Board ... may obtain a review ....
).
310. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
311. See, e.g., Massey v. Farmers Ins. Group, 837 P.2d 880, 885 (Okla. 1992) (stating the
appraisal procedure results were not binding on objecting party under state constitutional
provision); Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 475 P.2d 880,
883 (Cal. 1970) (refusing to enforce an award because of appraiser's misconception of
applicable law).
312. See id.
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about deciding that? It is often useful to think of challenges to the
work of that first decider of the case - whether lower court,
administrative agency, or arbitrator - as focusing on three different aspects of the case: procedure, fact finding, and interpretation
and application of the law. By subdividing a case into such components, one makes it easier to identify appropriate questions. In the
case of "procedural" matters, for instance, questions relating to
fairness and to the likelihood that the decision-maker had enough
evidence in hand to make a sensible decision emerge fairly quickly
as right things to ask. Anyone with experience of the legal system,
however, knows that such analytical separation is artificial. Deciding whether to characterize a relationship as "employment" or
"independent contractorship" is so much a mixture of fact-finding
and law-applying that calling it a "question of law" versus a "question of fact" is a largely arbitrary matter. The term "procedure" is
also misleading, for it ought to cover not just the technical rules
about the order in which proof is to be presented or what evidence
is admissible, but also questions about the adequacy of the forum as
an unbiased decision-maker. Nonetheless, using the three categories is likely to be helpful more often than harmful, and it is so
conventional that most lawyers and legislators probably think in
those terms. Often, identifying the nature of what is challenged
even more precisely than typing it as "law" or "fact" determines
how deferential the reviewing court should be. In the famous Chevron decision, to take probably the best known example, the
Supreme Court held that if an administrative agency is given
responsibility to administer a statute, and if that statute is silent or
ambiguous on an issue then "a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
'
made by the administrator of an agency."313
The second question -

how searching a review should be -

is

no easier. A reviewing court (or a legislature fixing a norm) has a
large number of standards of review from which to choose. It may
choose one for procedural matters, and another for questions of
fact. When examining fact findings, for example, a reviewing court
usually applies "presumptions of correctness" of one sort or
another.314 The stronger the presumption of correctness, the
313. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844

(1984).
314. See id.;
National Labor Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994).
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greater the chance of affirming the prior decision.315 If the question
is whether proper procedures were followed, a reviewing court
might ask only whether the prior hearing met minimal standards of
fair play,316 or might instead ask whether a procedural error could
have had any significant effect on the outcome of the case. 317 In
Gilbert v. Homar,1 8 the Supreme Court recently set out three factors to be considered in deciding what constitutes due process in
cases involving adverse action against public employees: (1) the private interest involved; (2) the risk of a mistaken deprivation of that
interest, and the extent to which added or alternative procedures
might reduce that risk; and (3) the government interest.319
A useful starting place may be to draw a line between de novo
review, in which the reviewing court essentially starts all over to try
the matter, and review to correct error. In de novo review, what
has happened in the first hearing of the case may matter very little.
That earlier proceeding need not be totally disregarded, however.
32 ° for example, Justice
In a famous footnote in Gardner-Denver,
Powell suggested that what a collective bargaining arbitrator had
done might well be admitted in evidence, and entitled to weight
depending on a number of factors, including, one gathers, the
321
apparent skill of the arbitrator in handling the issues in the case.
Because the arguments for true de novo review are so distinctive in
nature, and because some of those arguments are affected by the
way in which other types of review might operate, discussion of
these is postponed for the next section.
315. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994) (stating that "[t]he findings of the Board with
respect to question of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a

whole shall be conclusive"). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (1996) (contrasting
the NLRB provision of a state workers' compensation law calling for more searching review,
by stating "[r]eview of findings of fact by the trial court shall be de novo upon the record of
the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the
preponderance of the evidence is otherwise").

316. See, e.g., Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing how much
process is due before a public high school student may be suspended from class for 10 days

and from playing football for 60 days). By applying Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the
court found an informal interview satisfies adequate notice. See Palmer,868 F.2d at 95, 96.
317. This is much like the "harmless error" standard of criminal litigation.
318. 65 U.S.L.W. 4442 (U.S. June 9, 1997).

319. See id. at 4444.
320. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

321. See id.
at 60 & n.21.
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Review for error, on the other hand, looks more or less searchingly into what happened in the first tribunal.322 It is at this point
that presumptions of correctness and similar concepts come into
play.3 1 The verbal changes that can be rung on the contrapuntal
themes of the need for substantial justice and the desire for quick
and affordable decision-making seem almost infinite in number.324
For our purposes here, however, it is wise to recognize that standards that begin as different often merge into one another.32 One
Tennessee court recently observed, for example, that "[o]ver time,
the standards of 'fairly debatable,' 'rational basis,' and 'arbitrary
and capricious' have been used interchangeably and have come to
hold the same meaning. ' 326 It thus makes sense not to concentrate
on a particular verbal formulation so much as on whether a relatively "narrow" or a relatively "extensive" review is appropriate.327
B. Arguments for General De Novo Review on All Issues
Critics of Gilmer sometimes suggest that the harm done by that
decision can be undone in part by providing for de novo review of
arbitrators' decisions.328 Opponents of de novo review point out,
however, that providing this "second bite at the apple" comes with
a serious price tag.32 9 The loss of finality not only increases out-ofpocket expenses, it means delay, and very well could mean that
counsel will be tempted to treat the arbitration proceeding as a specialized form of discovery.33 °
It seems fair to predict that the Supreme Court is likely to reject
many of the reasons advanced for general de novo review. Two
principal arguments advanced on its behalf are essentially the same
as the arguments rejected in the Gilmer opinion itself: (1) discrimination cases are too complex to be finally disposed of through the
inadequate procedures of arbitration, and (2) widespread use of
arbitration in employment law matters will stifle the growth of the
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See Carter v. Adams, 928 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 641 (Tenn. 1990)).
See Carter,928 S.W.2d at 40.
See Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrabilityin Recent FederalCivil Rights Legislation: The

Need for Amendment, 26 Corr,. L. REv. 521, 578-79 (1994).

329. See id. at 580.
330. See id. at 565-67.
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law. 331 The third argument is that made by the Gilmer dissent:
whatever the underlying merits of arbitration, Congress simply has
not authorized its use in the employment law area.332 Whether that
may attract additional Justices when squarely presented is an open
question, but the tendency of the present Court to strongly favor
alternative dispute resolution leads this writer to believe, as the
prior discussion indicates, that the Court is likely to reject this argument also. A fourth argument, probably best captured in an article
by Professor Abrams, is that while the Congress has decided to
authorize arbitrators to consider statutory issues, the Congress has
meant arbitration to be an added forum, not a substitute forum for
discrimination matters.333 There is, however, a chance that a more
limited argument, one made by Professors Malin and Landenson,
for de novo review limited to questions of law, might ultimately
attract support either in the courts or in Congress.334 It is discussed
below.
C. Examining the Adequacy of Forum and Procedures
If one looks at section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act,335 it
seems clear that the federal courts could reasonably develop a relatively stringent standard of review for procedural irregularity.336
While "corruption" and "fraud" may seem fairly narrow in scope,
such terms as "undue means," "evident partiality" and "other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"
could justify quite extensive review. 337 Certainly this language indicates that the federal court should look carefully at the general adequacy of the forum to accomplish a fair and even-handed result.
How far can one reasonably expect the courts to go in this review of
the general fairness of the arbitration forum?
Review of arbitration procedure may well depend primarily on
two factors: (1) how closely the courts are willing to consider the
adequacy-of-forum factors sketched out in Justice White's opinion
331. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
332. See id. at 41.
333. See Abrams, supra note 328, at 557.
334. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1240 (1993).

335. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
336. See id.
337. See id.
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in Gilmer at the post-arbitration rather than pre-arbitration
stage,338 and (2) how much attention the courts are willing to pay to
the development of minimum standards for employment arbitration
by the major arbitration agencies.
In approving the order to use arbitration in Gilmer, Justice White
enumerated briefly a number of aspects of the New York Stock
Exchange rules that seemed to promise the rudiments of fair
play.339 He pointed specifically to rules prohibiting biased
panels;340 rules providing for at least rudimentary discovery
through "document production, information requests, depositions,
and subpoenas"; 341 and a requirement that decisions be public and
written and include at the least a summary of the issues and a
description of the award. 42 The discussion of the rules is brief, and
there have been charges that Justice White and the other members
of the Gilmer majority read those rules with much too tolerant an
eye. Professor Alleyne, for example, points out that the requirement that the "award" be in writing under New York Stock
Exchange Rules does not in fact typically result in fully reasoned
"opinion" writing.34 3 He cites an instance in which a sex discrimination hearing lasted fifty-five days and it was disposed of in an
arbitration panel's one-paragraph opinion. 3" Even though the
Court's cursory treatment of the adequacy of the forum is subject to
this criticism, it at least indicates willingness on the part of the
Court to entertain objections based on flaws in a particular arbitration process. The opinion also notes that if the arbitration forum
fails to measure up to basic standards of fairness, the Federal Arbitration Act provides for review.345
The concern of the employment law bar and the arbitrator community about Gilmer's implications led to the formation of the special task force, including representatives of the American
Arbitration Association, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, National Academy of Arbitrators, National Employment Law338. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991).
339. See id. at 30.
340. See id.
341. Id. at 31.
342. See idat 31-32.
343. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory DiscriminationClaims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in
the ArbitrationForum, 13 HoI'n-A LAB. Li. 381, 414 (1996).
344. See id. at 414 n.212.
345. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
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yers Association, The Labor and Employment Law Section of the
American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties Union and
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution that produced
the report mentioned earlier entitled: A Due Process Protocolfor
Mediation and Arbitrationof Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the
Employment Relationship.3 46 No agreement was reached on one

fundamental issue: whether it is appropriate to require an employee
to agree to arbitrate future statutory disputes as a condition of getting or keeping a job.3 47 Section A of the Protocol simply lays out

the principal arguments on both sides and leaves the matter
there.348 Section B states first that an employee must be given a
right to counsel. It then commends the practice of some companies
in providing for at least part of the cost of that counsel, and that the
employee is entitled to access to information that is "reasonably
relevant" to the claim, both at the hearing and before.349 Section C
addresses the qualification of arbitrators, insisting that steps must
be taken to ensure that the members of an arbitration panel "possess knowledge of the statutory environment in which these disputes arise and of the characteristics of the non-union
workplace., 350 Section D deals with judicial review and contains a
single sentence: "[tihe arbitrator's award should be final and binding and the scope of review should be limited."'351 Since the issuance of the Protocol, two of the major arbitrator-providing agencies
have issued further statements about their own policies and procedures. J.A.M.S./Endispute announced in the spring of 1996 that "it
no longer will accept such cases if the arbitration agreements don't
allow for full remedies, reasonable discovery, the right to counsel
and other safeguards. Remedies must include punitive damages
and attorney fees., 352 Soon after, the American Arbitration Association released its National Rules for the Resolution of Employ346. A Due Process Protocolfor Mediation andArbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising

out of the Employment Relationship,Disp. Resol. J., Oct. - Dec. 1995, at 37. Also reproduced
is a brief recounting of the history of the Protocol by Arnold Zack, one of the task force cochairs. See Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, Disp. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 36. The Protocol recently received official endorsement by the American
Bar Association. See id.
347. See Due Process,supra note 346, at 37.
348. See Due Process, supra note 346, at 37-38.

349. See Due Process,supra note 346, at 38.
350. Due Process, supra note 346, at 38.
351. Due Process, supra note 346 at 39.
352. Richard C. Reuben, Getting Out of a J.A.M.S., A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 41.
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ment Disputes 353 ("AAA Rules"), the ones at issue in the Cole
decision.35 4 Among other things, AAA Rule Seven states that the
arbitrator "shall have the authority to order such discovery... as
the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of
'
the issues in dispute."355
Rule Eight calls for a pre-hearing conference, involving the arbitrator and the parties, to help refine the
issues to be litigated and explore such procedural matters as special
rules of evidence or burdens of proof that may be involved.35 6 Rule
Fourteen provides for the right of counsel.15 7 Rules Twenty-two
and Twenty-three govern the admission of evidence, providing the
arbitrator with considerable discretion to admit material that might
be excludable in court. 35 Rule Thirty-two deals with the nature
and content of the award to be made.35 9 The award is to be "in
writing ... and shall provide the written reasons for the award

unless the parties agree otherwise." 6 ' The rules go on to say that
the arbitrator "may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator
deems just and equitable, including, but not limited to, any remedy
or relief that would have 36
been
available to the parties had the mat1
ter been heard in court."
What will be the impact of the Protocol and of these and similar
rules? One impact has already been mentioned. When the District
of Columbia Circuit panel considered the fairness of the AAA
362
Rules, one of the places it turned for guidance was the Protocol.
Another possibility is that at the review stage, they will be treated
by the federal courts as defining what constitutes the "undue
means" referred to in paragraph (1) of section 10 of the FAA, 63 or
the "other misbehavior" mentioned in paragraph (3).3 4 A strong
argument can be made that if the employment law community representatives of management interests as well as employee inter353. AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssoCIATION,NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION

OF EMPLOYmNr DisuTEs (1996) [hereinafter AAA].

354. See Cole v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1480-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
355. AAA, supra note 353, at Rule 7.
356. See AAA, supra note 353, at Rule 8.
357. See AAA, supra note 353, at Rule 14.

358. See AAA, supra note 353, at Rules 22,23.
359. See AAA, supra note 353, at Rule 22.

360. AAA, supra note 353, at Rule 22.
361. AAA, supra note 353, at Rule 22.

362. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
363. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (1994).
364. See id § 10(a)(3).
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ests - have reached agreement on these procedural matters, that
this ought to guide the courts in deciding what are the minimum
standards that an arbitration forum should meet in order for that
forum's award to be entitled to enforcement. If, for example, an
arbitration clause forbids an arbitrator to ask for or examine any
document the employer has labeled "confidential," such a drastic
departure from what the AAA Rules call for should probably lead
to a willingness on the part of the court to overturn what the arbitration panel has done.
This does not mean, however, that the court should overturn an
arbitrator's decision simply because the arbitrator has admitted or
excluded some bit of evidence the court would treat differently.
Elsewhere the author has argued, for example, that arbitrators
ought not to think themselves totally bound to follow the Supreme
Court's decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co.,36 which instructs the federal courts to admit so-called "afteracquired" evidence that an employee who has been fired for a
legally wrong reason (age discrimination in that case) has also been
guilty of other misconduct that would legally justify firing her.366
That evidence is to be used not to excuse the employer entirely, but
rather to decide how generous a remedy is appropriate. 367 The
author suggests that in most cases, an arbitrator dealing with a statutory rights case will want to reach the same result as a court would
reach, but that there are at least two reasons why a private arbitrator might reject "after-acquired evidence" when a court would
accept it. The first reason is limits on the arbitrator's powers contained in the submission of the case. If the parties' submission says
that what the arbitrator is to decide is whether the employer's
stated reasons for firing the worker were good reasons, then that is
what the arbitrator has power to do - not consider some other
reason that emerges only in the last moments of the hearing. The
second reason is the arbitrator's stake as a creature of the individual contract of employment. Implicit in that contract is a duty of
good faith and fair dealing368 - by which we mean that the parties
365. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
366. See id. at 362-63; Robert N. Covington, After-Acquired Evidence: What Should
Arbitratorsand CourtsDo After Misco, McKennon and Gilmer? 6 J. INDIVMUAL EMP. RTS.

81, 84-86, 88-89 (1997).
367. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360.
368. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTcrsA

§ 205 (1979).
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to the contract owe one another the duty to give the other party a
fair chance to earn the benefits of that contract. 369 An arbitrator
could, in an extreme case, conclude that for an employer to fire a
worker on a "trumped up" charge and then start looking for a good
reason to justify that discharge is so inherently unfair that she ought
not to consider the results of that late-in-the-day investigation, as a
matter of basic state contract law. What is required, then, is not
that an arbitration panel be identical to a court in structure or procedures, but rather that it meet the emerging community standards
of what constitutes due process for employment law arbitration.
D. Examinationfor Errors in Fact Finding
Unless the Court or the Congress decides to opt for de novo
review, it seems highly unlikely that courts asked to enforce awards
will be willing to re-weigh evidence and decide whether the arbitrator was correct in determining the facts of a case. The initial fact
finder enjoys advantages, such as seeing the witnesses, for example,
and enjoying at least some opportunity to seek clarification of a
muttered answer or a barely legible document, that reviewing
courts regularly defer to that first sifter of the evidence. This is
typically true of the review of lower court decisions just as it is of
arbitrator decisions.
The more serious problem is about evidence that is not submitted
or findings of fact that are not made. Suppose, for instance, that an
arbitrator finds that failing performance would justify a discharge
and states that in her opinion, but does not go on to address the
issue the fired worker has asked her to address: would the employer
have fired the worker but for his age? If, after all, the employee
was in court, he would be entitled to judgment if he showed that
age was a motivating factor in his firing, even though the employer
can demonstrate it would have fired him anyhow for other
370
reasons.
Judge Constance Baker Motley, of the Southern District of New
York, recently confronted a case much like this.371 The claimant
urged that his employer had constructively discharged him, by
369. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CorNTcrs § 205a.

370. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 200Oe-5(g)(2)(B) (1994).
371. See Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Mgmt., 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1623

(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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changes in work responsibilities, adverse performance reviews, and
suggestions he consider part-time work.37 He resigned because of
this allegedly intolerable treatment. 373 This constructive discharge,
he argued, violated the ADEA.374 He brought suit, and the
employer obtained a stay in order to have the case arbitrated under
securities industry rules.375 The arbitration panel heard testimony
and 376
argument, received more than 157 exhibits, and issued an opinion. The opinion stated the parties' arguments, then stated simply, "[t]he claims of Claimant 0. Beirne Chisolm... are dismissed
in their entirety. ' 377 The panel gave neither a statement explaining
the basis for this outcome, nor did it make findings of fact or state
conclusions of law.378
Judge Motley expresses sympathy for the claimant's plight, but
nonetheless enforces the arbitration panel's decision.379 Second
Circuit precedent, she notes, clearly states that "arbitrators are not
required to provide the rationale for their award.... [T]he party
challenging the award must show that no proper basis for the award
can be inferred from the facts of the case. ' 380 Here, the record
would clearly support a finding that the claimant's working conditions never became so intolerable that he was justified in claiming
he was constructively discharged.38 '
The crucial point in Judge Motley's reasoning is the doctrine38 that
an arbitrator is not required to offer a rationale for a decision.. If
the record would justify a fact finding unfavorable to claimant, that
is enough.383 When the Second Circuit has an opportunity to
review this doctrine again, will it hold to it? Here, one sees clearly
the artificiality of distinguishing between review of fact finding and
review of the adequacy of arbitral procedure. The Due Process
Protocol states: "The arbitrator should issue an opinion and award
372. See id.at 1625.

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
1994)).
381.
382.
383.

See Ud
See id
See id.
See Chisolm, 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1625.
Id. at 1625.
See id.
See id. at 1633.
Id.at 1628 (quoting Wall St. Ass'n v. Becker Paribas Inc., 27 F.3d 845, 849 (2d Cir.
See id. at 1632.
See Chisolm, 73 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1628.
See id.
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setting forth... a statement regarding the disposition of any statutory claim(s)."3 8 4 The AAA Rules are even more explicit: "The

award shall be in writing... and shall provide the written reasons
for the award.. .

."I"

The Dunlop Commission report quoted in

the Cole opinion is similar: "[I]f private arbitration is to serve as a
legitimate form of private enforcement of public employment law,
these systems must provide: ... a written opinion by the arbitrator
explaining the rationale for the result .
. 386 If, as suggested

above, the courts find these expressions of consensus on the part of
management and employee representatives to be worthy of judicial
respect, then "invisible" fact finding will no longer be acceptable.
This does not, of course, mean that detailed findings of fact on
every possible argument are necessary. In the Chisolm case, for
example, a single sentence saying the panel found the claimant had
not shown he was constructively discharged would be enough to
justify enforcing the award.3 87 Insisting on explicit fact-finding
would, however, protect him from the possibility that what the
panel really concluded was that Chisolm's employer did in fact
make his work situation intolerable, and did this because of a belief
that he was too old. Taking that into account, he was not entitled to
relief anyhow because a non-discriminating employer would have
objectively found his work so inferior that he ought to have been
fired. As things stand, neither Chisolm, nor his employer, nor the
reviewing courts, will ever know why the panel ruled as it did.
Another recent District of Columbia Circuit opinion suggests
that there is at least one other basis for refusing to enforce an
award based on a particular type of truly egregious fact finding:
finding for a party on an issue in the absence of any evidence at all.
The claim in Clark Construction Group, Inc. v. Alcon Demolition,
Inc.,388 was based on a contract for demolition services, not an

employment agreement, but the principle involved should clearly

384. Due Process,supra note 346, at 39.
385. AAA, supra note 353, at Rule 32.

386. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,1483 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
COMvISSION ON TI-E FuruIRE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RECOMIENDATIONS 30-31 (1994)).

RELATIONS,

REPORT AND

387. See Chisolm, 73 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1628.
388. No. 96-7148, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3147 at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1997) (per
curiam).
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apply to both.38 9 The arbitration panel ruled for Alcon on two
issues: whether its claim was arbitrable and whether the other party
wrongfully terminated the contract on the basis of Alcon's alleged
poor performance ("wrongful default termination").390 The reviewing panel affirmed on the first issue, but reversed on the second. 39'
It applied the principle, mentioned in dicta in Cole, that an arbitrator's decision may be set aside if it is in "manifest disregard of the
law," a phrase discussed in more detail below. 392 The panel stated:
However broadly a review for "manifest disregard of the law"
sweeps, the parties here agree that there must be some evidence
presented to prove a claim. Alcon has pointed to nothing in the
record that could be thought "some evidence" of wrongful
default termination ....

We therefore remand to the district

court for a determination of whether relevant evidence supportive of the award exists outside of the portions of the record to
which appellee has directed our attention.... 393
The decision as such obviously applies only to extreme cases, but
the brief memorandum opinion implies two significant points: First,
once a party challenging an arbitral decision has overcome any presumption of correctness to which it is entitled, the burden of persuasion is on the proponent of the award to show that the award is
nonetheless fairly entitled to enforcement. Second, a proponent
may demonstrate that the award ought to be enforced even though
the award itself is irregular or incomplete. Both points seem obviously in keeping with sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.3 94 The second

gives particular weight to the importance of making arbitration outcomes final whenever that is fairly possible.
E. Examinationfor Errors of Law
Perhaps the greatest difference between the review that an appellate court would give to a lower court opinion and the examination
a court will provide for an arbitration decision has to do with errors
of law. If a trial court makes an error in interpreting a statute, the
389. See Clark Constr. Group, Inc. v. Alcon Demolition, Inc., No. 95-2203, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8833, at *1 (D.D.C. Jun. 21, 1996).
390. See Clark, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3147, at *1-2.
391. See id.
392. See id. at *2.
393. Id. at *2-3.
394. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1994).
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appellate court simply corrects the mistake and decides whether the
mistake is likely to have had any real impact on the outcome of the
case. If so, the decision below will be reversed and the matter sent
back. In the case of arbitration, however, the fact that an arbitrator
misreads the law is not a reason to set her award aside.395
Several federal circuit courts, applying language in Wilko v.
Swan,396 have suggested that an award might be unenforceable,
however, if it is made "in manifest disregard of the law. ' 397 Many
of these statements are dicta, however, and occur in the course of
opinions that order arbitration or uphold an arbitrator's award.39 8
399
Judge Edwards reviews these briefly in his opinion in Cole.

What would such a standard mean? The phrase itself captures
the two most likely types of situations in which overturning an
award might be the right course. The first is a refusal by an arbitrator to listen to arguments based on one or more provisions of law.
Suppose, for example, an arbitrator were to say: "There was good
cause here for the discharge; that's all I need to know, don't bother
me with a lot of claptrap about discrimination." That would clearly
demonstrate that to the arbitrator the requirements of public law
are simply not relevant. The second situation is one in which the
arbitrator is aware of the requirements of public law, but chooses
for some reason not to apply that law.4"0 Suppose, for example,
that the arbitrator, Ms. A, says something like this:
"I realize that sexual harassment of a male by another male is
not treated as unlawful conduct in this Circuit, and that the contract does not call for this employer to do more than abide by the
395. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1986); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio. Ry. Co., 551 F.2d 136 (7th Cir.

1977).
396. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
397. See, e.g., Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.

1967) (stating that in Wilko, the Supreme Court held that an award, based on "manifest
disregard" of the law, will not be enforced).
398. See, e.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978) (denying motions to
vacate arbitration award and continuing the award).
399. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Judge
Edwards notes that a recent Supreme Court opinion indicates that this portion of Wilko v.
Swan remains in effect. See id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
941.43 (1995)).
400. See, e.g., Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1266-67 (7th
Cir. 1992).
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law. But that rule is so out of touch with the realities of modern
society that I am going to order the employer here to provide
relief to this worker who was hounded from his job because ' that
40 1
is how the Circuit Court should have interpreted Title VII.
Would such an award be enforceable in the individual employment
context?
Ms. B, a less forthright arbitrator, could make enforcement more
likely by reaching the same outcome, but basing her award on a
contractual good faith and fair dealing rationale (taking the defensible view that an employer who permits same-sex sexual harassment
has unfairly deprived the harassed worker of the opportunity to
earn the benefits of the employment contract). Should enforcement depend on such analytical niceties?
A broader view of what "manifest disregard" means appears in
dicta in the majority opinion in the District of Columbia Circuit's
Cole opinion.4" 2 Judge Edwards quotes two passages from the Gilmer opinion, one emphasizing that agreeing to use an arbitral
rather than a judicial forum does not imply a waiver of substantive
rights; the other stating the judicial review available under the
FAA, though limited, is "sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute' at issue."403 From these
statements he derives a view that in cases involving "novel or difficult legal issues" a court is "empowered to review an arbitrator's
404
award to ensure that its resolution of public law issues is correct.
To say that a federal court needs to insist that the arbitrator's decision be "correct" seems to imply something very like de novo
review on issues of law.
Two well-known academicians, Professor Martin Malin, a labor
and employment law specialist, and Professor Robert Ladenson, a
teacher of philosophy, have likewise urged that there should be de
novo review of arbitrators' decisions on issues of law.405 They base
their arguments on their view of what is required by the traditions
401. This could have happened in the Fifth Circuit prior to Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998).
402. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486-87.
403. Id. at 1487 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n.4
(1991)).
404. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.
405. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Law Arbitration From the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTnNGs LJ.1187, 1240 (1993).
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of Anglo-American jurisprudence.4 °6 The basic problem they pose

is "why an adjudicator acting under color of legal authority has a
moral right to decide issues for others and why persons subject to
those decisions have a duty to regard them as binding."40 7 After
reviewing Supreme Court precedent on the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards, including the Steelworkers Trilogy40 8
and Gilmer,40 9 they turn to the jurisprudential literature. Here,
they suggest "that all adjudication presupposes ethical constraints
grounded in what may be termed a moral minimalist conception of
natural law, ' 410 which they identify with the work of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th Century and Michael Walzer in the 20th.4 11 They
derive from the work of those writers the proposition that
a judge has two fundamental duties. First, she must apply the
civil law fairly, so that all of the parties in a given case receive
their due under the law. Second, if a case presents an issue of
interpretation in regard to a particular law, the judge must make
every effort
to interpret the law in a way that results in a just
41 2
decision.

But what is a "just" decision for the purposes of this second duty?
The authors discuss three jurisprudential theories that might provide an "appropriate standard of justice": legal realism, as
expressed in the work of Karl Llewellyn; the positivist theories of
H.L.A. Hart; and the notion of "law as integrity" developed by
Ronald Dworkin.4" 3 They interpret the legal realist view of judging

as one that allows a judge full authority to apply her personal view
of justice in deciding cases, a position that "raises the questions of
why anyone should regard themselves as having a duty to comply
with her personal law, and of why anyone should consider the use
of governmental power to enforce her personallaw as morally justified. ' 4 14 The other two views, by contrast, insist that there are sub406. See id. at 1190.
407. Id. at 1217.
408. The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
409. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
410. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1209.
411. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1209-10.
412. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1211.
413. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1212, 1214-17.
414. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1213-14.
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stantial constraints on a responsible judge. 415 Hart insists that a
judge's range of choice extends only to issues in a "penumbral
zone" of debatable cases that is relatively small compared to the
"core [area] of settled meaning" of particular statutes.416 The duty
to follow precedent thus acts as a moral and ethical constraint to
conform to a body of doctrine to which the body politic has consented.4 17 Dworkin is, like the realists, skeptical that the body of
precedent is sufficiently determinate to prevent a particular adjudicator from justifying almost any outcome on the basis of decisions
that are part of that precedent. Despite that, the authors say,
Dworkin finds a sufficient ethical constraint exists because of the
judge's duty to consider the whole body of sources of law, including
precedent, when deciding a particular case.4 18 The judge must seek
to find a "coherent set of principles" in the legal literature of the
system against which to test her decision by asking whether her
419
interpretation can conform to a "coherent theory" of the system.
The authors then ask whether the approaches of Llewellyn, Hart,
and Dworkin can supply a reasonable moral basis for the work of
an arbitrator and for the use of public authority to enforce an arbitrator's decision. 420 Here, they compare and contrast the work of
arbitrators under collective bargaining agreements and that of arbitrators appointed under individual contracts of employment: "grievance arbitrators" and "employment arbitrators ' '421 for short. For
both types, they posit situations in which two arbitrators, acting for
different parties, read identical language to justify opposite decisions.422 In the case of grievance arbitration, this is adequately justiffed, the authors reason, by the tenets of legal realism. 4 a What
the company and union bargained for was an arbitrator's reading of
their contract.424 They should be aware that grievance arbitration is
a non-precedental system, one in which variant readings of similar
415.
416.
417.
418.

See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1214-17.
Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1215.
See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1213-15.
See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1215-17.

419. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1217.
420. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1218.

421.
422.
423.
424.

See Malin
See Malin
See Malin
See Malin

& Ladenson,
& Ladenson,
& Ladenson,
& Ladenson,

supra note 405,
supra note 405,
supra note 405,
supra note 405,

at 1219, 1226.
at 1222, 1227.
at 1223.
at 1225.
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or even identical language are fairly common.42 5 If an arbitrator's

interpretation is wrong, the aggrieved employer or union has a
chance to bargain to overrule it when the next collective agreement
is negotiated. 426 When a court enforces a grievance arbitrator's
award, as it is to do under United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.2 7 so long as the award is in a broad

sense based on the collective agreement, it is simply holding the
parties to what they bargained for: an arbitrator's reading of their
contract language.42' The theories of Hart and of Dworkin would
be out of place in such a system, for they presuppose a concern with
prior decisions that does not apply in the grievance arbitration
context. 429

In employment arbitration, Malin and Ladenson argue, the situation is different. 43 ° Here, inconsistent decisions about the meaning
of a federal statute exist "in a single system of public law.""31 They
point to three concerns. First, the employer that has lost its argument about the meaning of the statute is likely to bear costs that
may put it at a competitive disadvantage. 32 While that may also be
true in grievance arbitration, there the losing employer must itself
share responsibility for its plight since it participated in drafting the
language the arbitrator has misread. 433 The employer does not participate directly in the drafting of a statute. 34 Second, while an
employer can get relief from an adverse grievance arbitrator's decision by bargaining for it, and by choosing other arbitrators in the
future, it has much less of an individual role in amending a statute.435 Third, there are different levels of concern about public justice values in the two systems.436 The central public values in
grievance arbitration are (1) reducing workplace strife, through settling disputes by bargaining or through arbitration rather than by
the use of economic force through strikes or lockouts; and (2)
425. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1223.
426. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1219.

427. 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
428. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1225.

429. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1225.
430. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1227.
431. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1227.

432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

See
See
See
See
See

Malin &
Malin &
Malin &
Malin &
Malin &

Ladenson, supra note 405,
Ladenson, supra note 405,
Ladenson, supra note 405,
Ladenson, supra note 405,
Ladenson, supra note 405,

at 1227-28.
at 1225.
at 1228.
at 1228.
at 1229.
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ensuring that a collective representative gives reasonable consideration to the claims of all those it represents, not just a few, a value
embodied in the duty of fair representation.4 37 Both these values
are generally consistent with the operation of market forces; we
assume bargaining consists of attempts by both unions and management to maximize returns to their constituencies, workers, or shareholders. Statutes may, on the other hand, involve attempts to
change the behavior of parties so that they do not always pursue
"market" objectives. In the case the writers hypothesize, for example, the two employers, both life insurers, reacted to biased potential buyers of insurance by assigning African-American sales agents
to offices in black neighborhoods and white sales agents to offices
in white neighborhoods. 38 Each was seeking simply to maximize
sales, and the officers who assigned employees were personally
unbiased and acted only out of an accurate perception that a
racially neutral job assignment would yield lower sales.4 39 The arbitrator who held for one of the insurers acted incorrectly in not subordinating the market value-maximized sales-to the public
justice value-non-discrimination in workplace opportunities. "It
follows," Malin and Landenson write, "that the private expectations
of the parties that provide the principal check on the labor arbitrators use of her own justice values can not serve the same function
for the employment arbitrator.""4 0 These three points largely echo
the thrust of Judge Edward's opinion in Cole,44 ' and while it is

tempting to find fault with some of the writers' other argumentsas conclusory, for example, in beginning with the assumption that
the Hobbes and Walzer positions are those of our tradition442
most of those arguments can be made to come out as sensible.
Even if one qualifies considerably their characterization of legal
realism by pointing out that others differed with Professor Llewellyn on a fair number of points, it is nonetheless true that his description of the judicial process was widely accepted. It is ultimately
then these three arguments on which the proposition rests that
437. See generally Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (explaining that arbitration can
settle disputes when the union follows its duty of fair representation).
438. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1227.
439. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1227.
440. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1229.

441. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
442. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1210-12.
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employment arbitrators' interpretations of public law should be
subject to de novo review.
Let us turn to the first. It amounts to an assertion that while
consent to having an arbitrator read one's contract justifies imposing on a party the cost of a misreading, consent to having an arbitrator read a statute does not. The proposition is not self-evident, as
the writers clearly understand. After all, the importance to a party
of a given right or duty does not depend on whether it is grounded
in public law or in contract. Indeed, a reasonable thesis might be
that a person is most likely to negotiate over those things that are
most important to him. The justification Malin and Landenson
offer is different: the party bearing the cost of the misreading in the
grievance context participated in the drafting of the contract. 44 3
There are two objections to this: First, it is only a partly accurate
version of what happens in collective bargaining; while outright
"take it or leave it" bargaining may violate subsections 8(a)(5) and
8(b)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 4 " pattern bargaining
and other instances of permitting the stronger party to set the terms
of an agreement are common. Second, even if one must accept
another setting of rights and duties, does it matter? Justice White's
opinion recognizes fully that the claimant had no power at all over
the terms of the stock exchange registration form." 5 His employer,
as a single member of the exchange, also had very limited power in
setting the rules of that body. 446 The Gilmer opinion makes it clear
that inequality in bargaining power is not enough to justify refusing
to honor an agreement to arbitrate, there must be coercion or
fraud.4 47 So long as only the parties are concerned, there is little if
any cause not to extend this reasoning to the review of awards." 8
There are, however, good reasons to accept the Malin and Ladenson argument when the impact of an award will extend to the rights
of others. Suppose, for example, that the arbitration of the insurance sales agent grievance purported to cover the rights of other
agents, including those not yet hired. If a federal district court were
443. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 405, at 1239.

444. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 15S(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1994).
445. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1991).
446. See id. at 33.
447. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Law Arbitration From the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTiNGs LJ. 1187, 1203 (1993).
448. See Malhn & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1203.
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to enforce such an award, it would sanction conduct that would continue to violate Title VII for years to come, and in situations the
arbitrator had not considered. That would, indeed, take the consent of a single individual to be subject to a possible mistake by an
arbitrator and give it a far broader public law impact. This would
take a "competitive disadvantage" of the sort Malin and Ladenson
identify well beyond those whose consent led to the award. 4 9
Those parties' consent cannot surely be allowed to have such a
broad effect. Thus, the writers have identified an important reason
why post-award review of employment law awards must at times be
more searching than in the case of grievance arbitration: An award
that goes beyond an award or denial of damages to the parties to
the arbitration may have an effect on the public law rights of
others.4 5 0
Professors Malin and Landenson might well respond by saying:
But what of the public interest in vindicating public law rights in
every case, not just those with broad affirmative relief? This argument is linked to the authors' third point, and is entitled to much
the same response: Yes, errors in law are important and arbitration
opinions and awards should be subject to some sort of review.45 1
Finality of awards is also important, however, and simply to state
two important competing values does not itself dictate how to strike
a balance between them.4 52
Professors Malin and Landenson's second argument is that grievance arbitration affords its parties reasonable protection against
unfair awards in (a) the constraints that in practice affect labor arbitrators, and (b) the opportunity to renegotiate troublesome contract language at the next collective bargaining session.453 The
constraints on arbitrators to which they refer seem to boil down to
the parties' ability to screen arbitrators and not to hire those who
render unprincipled or manifestly unreasoned decisions.4 54 This in
turn means that an arbitrator who wishes to stay in the business will
seek to make her rulings conform to some general norm of accepta449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

See
See
See
See
See

Malin
Main
Main
Malin
Malin

& Ladenson,
& Ladenson,
& Ladenson,
& Ladenson,
& Ladenson,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

447,
447,
447,
447,
447,

at 1227.
at 1207.
at 1191.
at 1192.
at 1195, 1199.

454. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1224.
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bility.455

To which an appropriate answer would seem to be: "Yes,
but." The "but" has at least two components. First, whether careful screening by the parties is aimed more at competence or at eliminating arbitrators who are "too liberal" or "too pro-company" is a
familiar debate topic, as is the question of whether an arbitrator
who wants to continue to draw assignments and who has also just
delivered nine consecutive awards for grievants may not feel a bit
nervous heading into the next hearing. Put briefly, the beneficence
of present techniques of arbitrator choice is at least open to
question.
Second, this article may make too little of the constraints posed
on individual arbitrators by the arbitral community. Conferences
sponsored by AAA, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS"), the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the
Labor and Employment Law Section of the ABA as well as the
existence of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, whatever its shortcomings, all contribute to creating a set of institutional expectations. These constraints are as likely to affect employment
arbitrators as well as grievance arbitrators.
The writers' other argument on this-that a wronged party in
grievance arbitration can more readily negotiate a remedy, in the
form of new contract language, than a wronged party in an individual employment law arbitration can effect a change in a statute 456is also flawed to a degree. If the wronged party is an individual
claimant, it is scant comfort to him that his union may have a
chance to protect the interest of other workers in bargaining some
three years hence. A wronged employer may, of course, have a better chance, but if the employer in question is a small enterprise in
an industry in which large employers set the patterns, the likelihood
of change is small. Once again, though, while the reasons given for
an argument may not fully justify their conclusion, the writers have
pointed out a truly valid concern: how best to limit the future consequences of a misreading of a statute while preserving the general
finality of arbitration.457
This leaves, then, the third point. An arbitrator's wrong reading
of a statute is just that-wrong. Therefore, it ought to be corrected.
455. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1224.
456. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1205-06.
457. See Main & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1206.
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Here, the argument gets a bit more complex. There is more than
one way an arbitrator can go wrong in interpreting a statute. One is
to fail to follow applicable precedent, thus violating the principles
set out by Hart.458 Another is to be so slavish to precedent that the
arbitrator confronted with a novel question is excessively cautious
in her reading of a statute even though she believes "that better law
would result from a more creative interpretation."'459 The first sort
of wrongness is a serious problem for followers of Hart. To allow a
court to enforce an award based on a reading of a statute that is out
of step with precedent is to use public power without legitimacy. 60
To fail to act creatively when creativity is called for is to fail the
system Dworkin terms Law as Integrity. (The authors choose
Hart's model as the better description of employment arbitration as
now practiced.) 461 Either way, the problem is whether a court,
legitimately vested with power by public action, can require a party
to honor an arbitration award that is wrong, simply because the parties to the arbitration have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's
decision. Malin and Landenson assert that this is an illegitimate use
of public power.462 In so doing, they ignore some important bodies
of precedent in our tradition. 463 A court asked to enforce the judgment of another jurisdiction will routinely do so without reviewing
the merits of the matter.464 The Supreme Court reiterated the point
early this year, stating: "[a] court may be guided by the forum
State's 'public policy' in determining the law applicable to a controversy.... But our decisions support no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and credit judgments.'' 465 The "law of the
case" doctrine, insulating decided issues from further review in
future proceedings between the same parties in the same case, has
much the same effect,466 a doctrine admittedly most often applied
458. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1217.
459. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1233.

460. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1225.
461. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1218, 1233.
462. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1232.
463. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 447, at 1233.
464. See Francis v. Francis, 945 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting argument
that giving full faith and credit would violate public policy of enforcing state); Matson v.
Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Minn. 1983) (holding a foreign judgment must be enforced to
its full extent, including any errors or irregularities contained therein); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS §117 (1971).

465. Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 118 S.Ct. 657, 664 (1998).
466. See Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
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to fact findings. Such doctrines do provide "outs" for serious
problems, of course. A foreign judgment will not be enforced if
entered by a court without jurisdiction.467 The law of the case doctrine is subject to an exception for cases of "manifest injustice."46' 8

These exceptions, however, have a ring much more like "manifest
disregard of the law" than like de novo review for error.469 The
point here is that any finality-enhancing doctrine, from res judicata
on, is likely to have an effect of lessening the vigor of examination
for error. And the price of arbitrator error for a middle-aged
woman fired allegedly for tardiness but in fact because she had the
courage to complain of sexual harassment can be a high price
indeed. Professor Grodin constructs just such a hypothetical for his
critique of Gilmer.470 But making arbitral judgments subject to fullscale review for errors of law has its price too. Critics of Gilmer
regularly point to the difference between employer resources and
those of workers.47 ' In the context of litigation, one implication of
that difference is that delay is more likely to prejudice the situation
of the weaker party, who stands in need of cash, not more litigation
costs. Each time a new doctrine providing for review is created, a
worker whose debatable claim has won out in arbitration is likely to
see the day when she gets money put further and further off, as
briefs are filed and arguments heard, and appeals taken to the next
higher court. If a court applies a standard like "manifest disregard"
under which it looks only for glaring errors and obvious flaunting of
the law, review is likely to be both less appealing to a losing
employer, and quicker if the employer nonetheless asks for it. It is
this potential for delay that in part refutes the point made by Judges
Edwards and Silberman in Cole, that most arbitration cases are
467. See, e.g., Midessa Television Co. v. Motion Pictures for Television, Inc., 290 F.2d 203
(5th Cir. 1961).
468. See, e.g., Harris v. P.S. Mortgage & Inc. Corp., 558 So. 2d 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1990),
469. See, e.g., Upshur Coals Corp. v. UMW, 933 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1991); New York Bus

Tours, Inc. v. Kheel, 793 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
470. See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims: Doctrine

and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 Hos'nA LAB. L.I. 1, 3 (1996).
471. See Maria Whittaker, Gilmer v. Interstate: Liberal Policy Favoring Arbitration
Trammels Policy Against Employment Discrimination,56 ALB.L. REv. 273, 276 (1992). "In
recent U.S. history... the courts... essentially shifted the balance of power more equitably
in favor of those who have long possessed far less bargaining power, such as consumers,
employees, blacks, and women. Recently, however, both the [Supreme] Court and
presidential administrations have been dismantling these gains." Id.
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more fact-based than law-based.472 They point to a study indicating
that roughly five of six grievance arbitrations involving discrimination claims turned mainly on factual findings.4 73 In consequence,

they urge that review for correctness of legal issues will result in few
delays. 474 This conclusion does not follow. Even if one assumes
that employment arbitrations will for the most part resemble grievance arbitrations on similar issues, a finding that a decision hinges
more on fact than law does not mean that debatable legal points
were not involved, points on which arguments about correctness
could be made plausibly enough to require briefing and argument,
with the attendant delay.
What of the value of maintaining a core of precedent that is both
consistent and coherent, though? Here Malin and Landenson are
very telling. 475 It is absolutely necessary that courts that enforce

employment arbitration awards do so in a way that says: "It is only
the award we enforce. There may be debate about some of what is
said in the opinion. Those issues of law remain ripe for us when
raised here. What the arbitrator has said on these is not precedent
for us or for other arbitrators. '476 By keeping the non-precedental
nature of this sort of arbitration clear, the system of precedent that
Hart and Dworkin value (in different ways) can be preserved. Nor
should a legal realist be affronted by such an outright disavowal of a
ruling, even though he might explain it differently.
A refusal by a court to rule on an arbitrator's interpretation of a
statute can, however, raise yet another problem. If virtually all litigation activity under a statute comes to be arbitration, is the public
deprived of adequate guidance about what is lawful and what is
not?4 7 7 This prospect was put before the Court in Gilmer and
rejected.4 7 8 Responding to it, Justice White wrote: "Furthermore,
judicial decisions addressing ADEA claims will continue to be
issued because it is unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants
will be subject to arbitration agreemenits.... Finally, it should be
472. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
473. See id.

474. See id.
475. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, PrivatizingJustice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Law Arbitration From the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HAsTNGs LJ. 1187, 1238 (1993).

476. Id.
477. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
478. See id.
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remembered that arbitration agreements will not preclude the
EEOC from bringing actions. . .

."9

To this point, Justice White's

observation seems to be a fair one. Employment law case filings
continue at a good clip, and decisions continue to flow from the
courts at a rapid pace.48° But what if this changes? That would
seem to be a matter for the Congress.
Can one rely on the Congress to note either a marked drop-off in
the volume of discrimination law precedent coming from the courts,
or a pattern of error-filled arbitration decisions? Malin and
Landenson argue that "judicial mistakes are... more likely to be
corrected legislatively because of their sweeping precedential value
than are arbitral mistakes which have no stare decisis value."4'81

Were Congressional staffs the only source of oversight, this might
well be a telling point. In fact, however, there are both public agencies, like the EEOC, and a host of private groups representing both
employer and employee interests ready to bring perceived failings
of the arbitration systems to the attention of the Congress. It will
then be for the legislative branch to decide whether misreading of
its statutes call for corrective action.4 82

This review of the arguments made by Professors Malin and
Landenson, some of them echoed in Cole, leads, then, to the conclusions, first, that the advocates of broad review for errors of law
in employment arbitration cases have some strong arguments; and,
second, that in cases that involve only the interests of those who are
parties to an arbitration under review, those arguments are not
strong enough to compel de novo review. In such cases, seeking to
correct truly blatant errors or flouting of the law by an arbitrator
should be an adequate protection for the participants. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, for
instance, recently overturned an arbitration panel's denial of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff since this was a "manifest disregard" of the law developed by the federal courts.48 3
479. Id. at 32. The second sentence quoted is focused primarily on another point but is

clearly relevant to the concept articulated in the first.
480. The most recent bound volume of BNA's Fair Employment Practice Cases, Volume

73, covers the period from Mar. 3, 1997 to June 30, 1997. It runs 1,888 double-spaced pages.
481. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 475, at 1237.
482. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 475, at 1203 (discussing past congressional
corrections of judicial misreading).
483. Degaetano v. Smith Barney, 75 F. Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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For non-participants, however, the balance shifts. Whenever an
award infringes the protections provided by public law to those who
are not parties, due regard for the public decisions made by the
Congress requires that a reviewing court see to it that the interpretations of public law reached by the arbitrator are not merely
debatable but are, in the court's judgment, correct.48 4 If deference

is due from a court with respect to such issues, it is due not to an
arbitrator, but to the EEOC, as the agency entrusted most fully
with enforcement of the nation's laws against discrimination.4 8 5
F. Consistency With Public Policy
A further reason to deny enforcement of an arbitration award is
the "public policy" rationale. If what an arbitration award calls for
a party to do violates a clear public policy, the award may not be
entitled to enforcement. The most typical case seems to be that in
which an arbitration panel orders an employer to restore a drug
user to a job involving significant safety hazards. 48 6 The Supreme
Court indicated in its Misco decision dealing with arbitration in the
collective bargaining context that such refusals to enforce are
proper only in the most extreme cases.48 7 This very limited doctrine

extends at least to an award that by its terms would require a complying employer to violate public law.488 Thus, if an arbitrator's
award should order an employer to hire only males, or senior citizens, or Asian Americans, surely that order would be denied
enforcement. 48 9 If the award was simply to re-hire "John Smith"
because the arbitrator decided that Smith was fired in violation of
the ADEA, enforcement would not be denied simply because the
court would not have found Smith to be fully qualified for the job in
question.

484. See Rebecca White, The EEOC,the Courts, and Employment DiscriminationPolicy:
Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. Rev. 51
(1995) (stating arguments for and against deference to EEOC interpretations).

485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

See id. at 51, 53.
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, 155 L.R.R.M. 2782 (1st Cir. 1997).
See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
See id.
See id. at 43 (stating that a court may refuse to enforce a collective bargaining

agreement where the specific terms contained violate public policy).
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VI.

LABOR COURTS OR COWBoY ARBITRATIONS?

If the conclusions suggested thus far are even approximately correct, the next decade may well witness a development some have
long advocated: creation of a series of specialized employment
tribunals. These will resemble in part tribunals in other countries,
but differ in being private, although subject to limited "review" by
public courts. Two obstacles might prevent this from happening, or
result in a system so bad it would have to be dismantled. One
would be the lack of an effective bar ready to represent workers in
these proceedings. The other would be the withdrawal of employer
consent, should the frequency of arbitration requests and the costs
of these tribunals make the courts seem a better bargain.
First, a quick review of the conclusions suggested up to this point:
(1) Despite well-reasoned decisions and commentaries to the contrary, the majority position of the federal courts is that the exception in section 1 of the FAA precludes mandatory arbitration of
claims of only a very small number of workers. That view is likely
to prevail in the Supreme Court. (2) Despite vigorous criticism of
the Gilmer decision to order arbitration of an individual's claim that
his statutory right to be free from employment discrimination, there
has been no unequivocal rejection of the decision by the Congress.
It thus remains "good law." The only serious criticism at the Congressional level has been requiring agreement to arbitrate statutory
rights disputes as a condition of employment. (3) While most federal courts have read Gilmer generously, extending it to statutes
other than the ADEA, there are increasing indications that these
same courts are also taking seriously the language of the Gilmer
opinion that sets basic standards for the adequacy of the arbitral
forum. Outside the courts, a consensus is emerging-expressed, for
example, in the Dunlop Commission Report and the Due Process
Protocol-about what the characteristics of an adequate forum are.
These consensus documents should influence the standards the
courts ultimately set. (4) "Review" of the opinions and awards of
employment arbitrators will be limited, but will probably be more
extensive than review of grievance arbitration awards, both because
in employment arbitration the claimant does not have the experienced advice of a union, and because in some cases, an employment arbitrator's award may affect the public law rights of persons
who are not participants in the arbitration process. In the latter
case, de novo consideration of questions of law ought to be made
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available. Courts are also likely to refuse to enforce any award that
would require a party to engage in ongoing unlawful activity; an
award given after a hearing in which the arbitrator flagrantly violated the rules under which she operates so as to deny the parties
the process due them; an award based on conclusions of fact that
have absolutely no basis in the evidence taken; and, of course, any
award that violates the explicit standards of the FAA.
All well and good, one might say, but does examination, on
request, by a court of the procedures, fact finding, or legal conclusions of an arbitrator mean there is a "system" of adjudication?
The probable answer is "yes," because the bulk of employment
arbitration is likely to occur within the framework provided by a
limited number of agencies whose business is to provide arbitrators
and administrative support for arbitration cases. Reading the opinions in Gilmer and Cole makes it clear why this is so. In each case,
the claimant challenged the adequacy of the arbitration forum.4 90
In each, the order to arbitrate was given only after an examination
of the rules governing the arbitration process, rules set by the securities industry and amplified by New York law in Gilmer,491 the more
recent (and more exacting) rules for employment arbitration issued
by the American Arbitration Association in Cole.49 The Gilmer
review included examining the institutional protections against
biased arbitrators, suggesting that some sort of screening process
for these private adjudicators is desirable.493 Developing reasonable procedures, screening and training arbitrators, providing assistance in scheduling hearings, finding hearing rooms, and the like, are
all far more likely to be done by organizations like the AAA or the
FMCS than by an individual arbitrator or employer. Employerdeveloped procedures would seem likely to be regarded with at
least a modest amount of suspicion in any event, because of the
obvious temptation to make them one-sided. The best chance an
employer will have, then, of making an arbitration clause pass judicial scrutiny is to provide that the arbitration will go forward under
the aegis of an established reputable organization. In consequence,
what we are likely to see over the next decade is an increasing
number of individual employment contracts that provide for arbi490.
491.
492.
493.

See
See
See
See

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30; Cole, 105 F.3d at 1467.
Gilmer,500 U.S. at 30.
Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480-81.
Gilmer,500 U.S. at 30.
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tration of disputes under the rules of the AAA, the FMCS or some
similar organization.
If employment arbitration becomes a process conducted within
an organization structure, it will share many characteristics with
"labor courts" in other countries. A brief comparison of arbitration
under AAA rules (as in Cole) to pursuing a case through a British
industrial tribunal should make the point. The underlying philosophy of the British tribunal system is well-captured by a passage in a
well-known management handbook, Roger Greenhalgh's Industrial
Tribunals.4 94 Others, he notes, had identified early on, certain characteristics which often gave tribunals (not just industrial tribunals)
advantages over courts, including cheapness, accessibility, less technicality, expedition and expert knowledge of their particular subject. He goes on:
Industrial tribunals are cheaper, more accessible, less technical
and quicker than the ordinary courts. They have detailed knowledge of industrial and commercial employment which the ordinary courts lack. The characteristics overlap.
One reason why tribunals are cheaper is that there are fewer procedural technicalities. They are not bound by complicated rules
about how cases should, before hearing, be defined on paper.
Their proceedings are less formal. Any applicant or respondent
may appear in person or be represented by any other person,
legally qualified or not. Strict rules of evidence do not apply.
Tribunal members will question unrepresented or poorly represented litigants and their witnesses to discover what, in legal
terms, their cases are all about....
Lack of technicality and reduction in actual or potential expense
in turn increase tribunals' accessibility. Potential litigants are less
likely to be frightened off by legal mumbo-jumbo and the prospect of huge lawyers' fees.. . . They sit in numerous locations,
making them physically as well as psychologically more
accessible.
The speed with which tribunals can deal with cases is also influenced by their lack of technicality. Where there are no pre-trial
procedures a case can, from the tribunal administrator's point of

494. ROGER

GREENHALGH, INDUSTRIAL TRImUNA.LS
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view, be heard as soon as an application and a response to it have
been received and a tribunal is available to hear it....
It would be a simple business to substitute "arbitrators" for
"tribunals" in this passage and then slip it into Justice White's opinion in Gilmer. Many of the concerns about competency and bias
now being expressed in the United States are also mirrored in the
British tribunal statutes. Most tribunal panels consist of three
members.496 One, who chairs the panel, must be a barrister or
solicitor who has been called or admitted to practice for at least
seven years; the other two members are non-lawyers, one drawn
from an employer panel, the other from an employee panel.497
Appeal of findings of fact by tribunals is extremely limited,4 98 the
fairness and wisdom of which has been criticized there just as
"unjust finality" is here.4 99 There are also, of course, notable differences. The tribunals are public bodies. The members of tribunals
are selected by public officials, not by the parties. 500 In the United
States, most arbitrators are selected from panel lists furnished by a
public or private agency by a "striking" process in which the parties
alternate in removing names from the list until only one remains;
agency selection is an option,50 1 but not one much used. Appeal on
errors of law is broader in the UK than review is likely to be under
a "manifest disregard" approach, although the Employment Appeal
Tribunal (and any court to which appeal is allowed) is to reverse
only if the error in law was critical to the outcome. 50 2 If the decision is also based on an alternative correct ground, the appeal must
be dismissed. That appeals do cause significant delay is clear. The
average time for an appeal is roughly a year.50 3 If a remittal
(remand) is necessary, much more time will be taken.50 4 The tribu495. Id. at 8-9. The statutes authorizing tribunals have largely been replaced by a
consolidating and amending statute, the Industrial Tribunals Act 1996 (Acts 1996 ch. 17), but
that statute does not affect the quoted passages. See id.

496. See id. at 9.
497. See id.
498. See Guy PRITCHARD, INDUsTRIAL TRIBUNALS 158-160 (1996); Stewart v. Cleveland

Guest (Engineering) Ltd., 1994 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 440 (1994).
499. See O'Kelly v. Trusthouse Forte PLC, [1983] Indus. Rel. L. Rep. 369 (C.A.)

(dissent).
500. See GREEmALGH, supra note 494, at 9.

501. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1404.12(d) (1997).
502. See GREENHALGH, supra note 494, at 52.
503. See PRrrCHARD, supra note 498, at 161.
504. See PRrrcHARD, supra note 498, at 152-63.
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nals system in the U.K. is publicly funded, so that the parties have
fewer administrative costs to bear than in U.S. arbitration. There is
no arbitrator's fee to be paid. 50 5
Despite these differences, the similarities between British industrial tribunals and the private arbitration tribunals are great enough
to justify the assertion that if the concerns over procedural regularity mentioned in Gilmer and elaborated in greater detail in Cole
and other decisions do indeed lead to widespread use of a limited
number of professional dispute resolution entities, then we will
indeed have a system of "American Labor Courts." Is this paradise? Of course not. Even experienced arbitrators can be overwhelmed by the intricacy of some recent employment legislation.
The British make the same complaint: "Whether experience in
employment equips tribunal members with 'expert knowledge of
[the] particular subject' of racial and sexual discrimination is open
to question," says one U.K. commentator, who complains most bitterly about language in the Equal Pay Act.50 6 Technicality in stat-

utes means delay in decision; delay means higher cost.
The key to making this emerging system work effectively is getting effective representation for the parties. It is the problem Elliott Cheatham addressed so elegantly, of "A Lawyer When
Needed.'5°7 Counsel in litigation perform many functions besides
advocacy. They are the gatekeepers, who can recognize hopeless
cases and steer parties away from asserting baseless claims and
defenses. They are familiar with the costs of litigation, in money
and also in time and energy, and can thus help in knowing at what
point settlement is a sensible option. To perform these functions
best, however, the lawyer in question needs to have (or have access
to) specialized knowledge of employment law and practice. 50 8 A
substantial grievance arbitration bar already exists in the United
505. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-84. If the view of the Cole majority prevails in the U.S.,
so that employers pay this fee, this difference will affect only them.
506. See GREENHALGH, supra note 494, at 11.
507. ELLIOTr EvANs CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963).
508. That knowledge also matters, of course, in advocacy. In British industrial tribunals,
where cases can be tracked as a matter of public record, one formal study shows that
employers represented by counsel fare better than those who represent themselves. The
same study did not find that correlation in the case of claimants. They actually fared slightly
better when representing themselves. The sample size of the study was small enough to
make these findings of limited value. See NIGEL TREML=zT & NrrYA BARENnr, THE 1992
SURVEY OF INDusTRLAL TRIBUNAL APPLICATIONS

(1975).
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States, along with a substantial body of experienced grievance arbitrators. What will happen in the case of employment arbitration?
There is good reason to suppose that the law firms representing
management will be just as able and just as willing to function in
these forums as in grievance arbitration and the courts. On the
claimant's side, the issue is more complex. Almost all grievance
arbitration counsel for claimants have been furnished by unions.
Not many U.S. white-collar workers are members of unions in the
private sector these days. The non-union employment claimant's
bar is still taking shape. It is a mix of plaintiff's counsel who are
better acquainted with courts than with arbitration, some traditional union-representing attorneys who have begun to branch out
in response to the recent shrinkage in the organized percentage of
the work force, and a handful of persons for whom this work is a
full-time preference. Will this amalgam coalesce into a bar that has
high standards of qualification and an ethos of professionalism?
The answer depends in part, of course, on whether the economic
rewards will justify the existence of such a bar. The volume of
potential work is great. Filing levels at the EEOC alone make that
clear.5" 9 Whether that will ultimately translate into a large enough
body of substantial successful claims one simply does not know.
Fears that arbitrators will be less generous than juries may or may
not prove well founded. One other source of representation has
not yet been tapped much: legal services programs. Relatively few
wrongful discharge plaintiffs have probably met indigency standards except in race and gender discrimination cases. Those have
been handled by private practitioners in court on a contingency fee
basis. The likelihood of collecting a fee has been enhanced by the
Equal Access to Justice Act.5 10 Whether this pattern will continue
in an arbitration regime one cannot know. If legal services office
representation of individual claimants becomes more common, it
will probably be either because a wider range of claimants came
forward to press claims, or because private practitioners find they
509. See, e.g., EEOC FISCAL YEAR 1994 ANN. REP. The most recent statistics generally

available indicate that charges received by the EEOC in fiscal year 1994 totaled 173,465, up
from 164,474 in fiscal year 1993. See EEOC FISCAL YEAR 1994 ANN. REP. at 6. Charges of
violations decreased in only one category, age, and that by less then two percent. See id. at
10. There was, however, a modest decrease in the number of cases filed by the agency, from
398 in 1993 to 357 in 1994. See id. at 20. This number remains adequate, however, to
generate substantial numbers of precedents.
510. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (1994); see 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
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cannot afford to continue. If the latter is true, it will be necessary to
inquire into whether arbitrators, out of habit formed in other types
of arbitration, are refusing to award fees when the courts would.
Such a refusal could well qualify as a "manifest disregard of the
law" as readily as refusal to entertain disparate impact claims.
If arbitrators prove to be effective protectors of individual
employee rights, there is, of course, the danger that employers will
cease to see arbitration as a way out of high cost litigation and will
withdraw their consent to participate.5 11 Whether this will happen
it is far too early to forecast. What little evidence there is, however,
suggests that an increasing number of non-union firms have been
adopting grievance and arbitration systems, even though there is
less and less "union avoidance" reason to do so. 512 This suggests
that firms who have tried private adjudication have been pleased,
even though they lose cases. What might change that is if the availability of arbitration results in a significant increase in the number
of claims made. This is another reason the "gate keeper" function
of counsel is so important.
Will the decisions be perfect? No. But it is wrong to think the
choice is between fast, but nearly always wrong, decisions on the
one hand and slow, but nearly always right, decisions on the other.
Courts too err, and even if clients can afford appeals, there is a limit
to what can be accomplished. Nor need we fear that the courts will
have no role in the continuing development of the law of discrimination. Not every employment contract is going to include an
agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, the EEOC and other agencies
will continue to have their day in court.51 3 More importantly, to the
extent that class action claims lie beyond what a private forum can
511. See Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L. REv. 693,

714 (1993).
512. See John T. Delaney & Peter Feuille, The Determinantsof Nonunion Grievanceand
Arbitration Procedures, in INUSDRIA. RELATIONS RESEARCH AssOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS
oF THE FORTY-FouRTH ANNUAL MEETING 529 (John F. Burton, Jr. Ed., 1992); Richard B.
Peterson, The Union and Nonunion Grievance System, in RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN
INDUrTRL RELATIONS & HtrmAN RESOURCES 131, 157-59 (David Lewin et al., eds., 1992).
513. One recent decision by a district court may make this a less meaningful remedy. In
EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., the court held that the EEOC may seek only class wide or
equitable relief on behalf of employees who have assigned arbitration agreements, and may
not seek money damages. See 979 F. Supp. 245, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court purports to
base this on language in the Gilmer opinion. See id. To require a second proceeding-in an
arbitration forum-to deal with the money damages remedy, in addition to the EEOCbrought action could be discouraging to claimants.
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reasonably handle, the courts should refuse to require that those
cases be heard by arbitrators. The justification for denying an order
to arbitrate is that the issues involved affect interests beyond those
of the parties so that the matter is not an "issue ... referable to
arbitration" under section 3 of the FAA.514 Those two bodies of
case should provide a fully adequate opportunity for development
of the law. In the meantime, the average claim will have a chance
to be heard by a specialist in a tribunal whose rules are designed to
serve that sort of case.
At bottom, then, the most serious questions about whether arbitration can be an adequate forum for employment law claims and
defenses are not structural. Judicial enforcement of standards, particularly if sensitive to the concerns expressed in the Due Process
Protocol and the Dunlop Commission Report, can see to that. The
real questions are personnel questions: How resourceful, open, and
otherwise competent will the arbitrators prove to be? Will a highly
qualified employment bar be ready to serve the needs of workers
and employers in arbitration? If the answer proves to be "yes,"
then what will be available to individual American workers is not
"cowboy arbitration" but the sort of affordable, quick and principled labor court that those workers deserve. If that is true, then the
typical worker should embrace an agreement to arbitrate statutory
rights in individual cases, even if the Congress chooses to forbid
employers from consenting to arbitration as a condition of
employment.

514. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
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